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Private Ordering in Light of the Law:
Achieving Consumer Protection Through
Payment Card Security Measures
Edward A. Morse* & Vasant Raval**
ABSTRACT
A private ordering regime has developed within the payment card
industry to define appropriate security practices and to monitor com-
pliance by network participants. Market demands for trustworthy sys-
tems upon which consumers and merchants could rely provide
incentives for security, which the card brands supplement by privately
designed fines and sanctions imposed through contract. Although pri-
vate ordering has functioned sufficiently well to make payment cards
a trusted payment method, the system is not completely secure, as
data security breaches continue to occur. This is not surprising, as
complete security is not a feasible goal. Nevertheless, some have
questioned whether additional government regulation is necessary to
protect consumers. This Article explores the effects of legal interven-
tion, including disclosure laws, on this private ordering system. It
questions whether additional government intervention would enhance
consumer welfare, particularly when consumers will likely bear the ul-
timate costs of such regulation. It recommends modifications in
breach disclosure laws to eliminate individual notice requirements in
favor of public notices, which may reduce costs and enhance consumer
welfare. It challenges "bounty" enforcement regimes, such as
FACTA, which offer little marginal benefit to consumers while sub-
stantially raising costs. It identifies practical and political problems
presented by the different capacities of large and small firms to bear
security costs, which are not easily solved under either private order-
ing or legislative approaches. Finally, it offers a set of policy issues as
a possible agenda for consideration by policy makers and researchers
in this domain.
* Professor of Law, McGrath North Mullin & Kratz Endowed Chair in Business Law,
Creighton University School of Law.
** Professor of Accounting, Creighton University College of Business Administration. The
authors are grateful for comments and insights on an earlier version of this paper from partici-
pants at Economic Governance and Competition: The Pros and Cons of Private Ordering in the
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INTRODUCTION
Private ordering describes a broad range of methodologies for gov-
erning behavior and resolving disputes that depart from a model of
governance by law promulgated by sovereign governments and en-
forced through government-sanctioned courts.' Although private or-
dering can occur in contexts that are effectively insulated from the
reach of traditional law enforcement,2 it often occurs within the public
legal system. This close relationship between public and private
1. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1031, 1033-35 (2009) ("[I]n its simplest form, the private ordering
literature posits a dichotomous choice between public courts and private legal systems."); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2003) ("Private ordering can be
viewed as part of a broad spectrum within which rulemaking is classified by the amount of gov-
ernmental participation involved."). Although Drahozal focuses on courts and Schwarz focuses
on rulemaking, private ordering may involve both rules and enforcement processes.
2. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000).
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realms causes private ordering to occur, as some have described it,
within the "shadow of the law."3
Private ordering literature often focuses on situations that are
rooted in contract, where self-interested behavior moves the parties
toward privatizing the rules that govern their relationship and the
processes for resolving disputes and enforcing their agreements. This
often works well for groups with particularized needs, which are not
well served by the traditional legal infrastructure. 4
But other instances of private ordering are more systematic and
perhaps more closely connected to the legal order. For example, pri-
vate entities in the United States promulgate generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP). 5 These principles and standards have
become the established basis for U.S. financial reporting, and they are
also used for limited purposes in constructing federal income tax
laws.6 In this context, private ordering may be considered as a con-
ventionally outsourced infrastructure, on which the law depends heav-
ily.7 Just as a firm chooses to outsource a function based on efficiency
considerations, governments also outsource the machinery of regula-
tion, choosing in some cases to leave matters of rulemaking and en-
forcement outside of government hands.
Public interests may also be implicated when private ordering oc-
curs, causing government to intervene in order to protect those inter-
ests. In some cases, mere threats of government intervention may
induce self-regulation efforts designed to preempt government action,
3. See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM L. REV. 2328, 2331 (2004). Richman notes that this
shadow analogy "requires recognizing that the 'principle contribution of courts to dispute resolu-
tion is providing a background of norms and procedures against which negotiations and regula-
tion in both private and governmental settings take place."' Id. at 2367, n.6 (citation omitted).
4. See id. at 2333-37 (discussing literature reviewing private ordering behaviors in discrete
communities, including ranchers, Orthodox Jewish diamond merchants, and fishmongers in
which community mechanisms relying on reputation displaced traditional legal means for enforc-
ing commercial agreements).
5. See Lawrence Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking, and
the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 312-13 (2005). However, since 2002, Congress
has inserted the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) into the auditing stan-
dards process. Id. Its first act was to adopt much of GAAS. Id. at 313. Although the PCAOB is
technically a private corporation, scholars view it as part of the government. Id.; see also Donna
M. Nagy, The SEC at 70: Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCA OB and its Public/
Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
6. GAAP is particularly important in matters of tax accounting, although tensions exist be-
tween financial and tax accounting goals. See generally STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX
ACCOUNTING j 2.02(2)(c) (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2010).
7. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389
(2003).
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thereby preserving private autonomy.8 In this sense, law may be seen
as a light that shines on private behavior, causing self-correction with-
out the need for government displacement of the private benefits ob-
tained from autonomous coordination, such as "insourcing"
rulemaking and enforcement functions.9
Whether law casts a shadow or shines a light, government policy-
makers should fully comprehend how private ordering works today
before choosing to intervene. A careful consideration of all options in
the range of private ordering and public regulation is critical to
achieve pre-set objectives in a cost-effective manner. While insourc-
ing is an option often exercised, in some situations, a complete take-
over of standard-setting and enforcement machinery proves not only
costly, but also dysfunctional for the industry and its stakeholders.
This Article addresses the respective roles of private ordering and
public laws in the development and implementation of the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS). PCI DSS have
emerged from collective actions by payment card networks, and they
are rooted in the economic self-interests of network participants to
achieve a trustworthy means of channeling electronic payments. Pro-
tections for consumers can thus be viewed as an intentional byproduct
of this self-interested behavior. Public laws have influenced the devel-
opment of these standards, but have done so with minimal interfer-
ence. However, threats of additional government intervention loom
in the context of significant security failures within the industry.
Whether intervention is appropriate or desirable, as well as the extent
of that intervention, presents some troubling economic and political
questions, which are explored below.
8. See id. at 428.
9. The PCAOB may be viewed as an example of such displacement:
Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the PCAOB or
the Board) in direct response to the collapses of Enron and WorldCom, and the bevy of
other accounting and corporate governance scandals capturing front page headlines in
2001 and 2002. As the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, its immediate mission
was to restore public confidence in the securities markets by ensuring the integrity of
the accounting firms that audit financial statements for publicly traded companies. To
achieve this end, Congress vested the PCAOB with broad governmental powers and
responsibilities, including the authority to register accounting firms that audit public
companies; enact rules setting standards for auditing, quality control, ethics, and inde-
pendence; inspect on a yearly basis the nation's largest accounting firms and inspect
other firms at least once every three years; investigate accounting firms and their asso-
ciated persons for possible violations of PCAOB rules or the federal securities laws;
and impose discipline for established violations through a range of sanctions including
censures, temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and substantial monetary fines. The
PCAOB is now, without question, the congressionally designated auditor for auditors.
Nagy, supra note 5, at 977-78 (footnotes omitted).
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We argue that the robust competitive market forces in the credit
card industry, coupled with a dynamic technological environment,
counsel against government intervention regarding the standards for
security or the consequences of unsecure behavior. Consumers will
likely bear the additional costs of intervention, and it is far from clear
that moving the locus of enforcement from the network to the govern-
ment or deepening compliance burdens would provide net marginal
benefits in this context without significantly disrupting the payment
card ecosystem, particularly when that system includes small
merchants who cannot effectively spread their compliance costs.
However, should legislators mandate constructive and equitable post
hoc procedures for disclosing security failures, these procedures may
enhance the effectiveness of market forces in achieving greater con-
sumer protection.
We also discuss the possibility that ancillary externalized costs, in-
cluding the costs imposed on issuing banks to replace cards that have
been compromised, are not adequately addressed by contract within
the private ordering regime. Although the marketplace is capable of
allocating these costs (and probably routes them back to consumers),
choosing to reallocate by creating new legal paths for recovery
presents a political choice, rather than economic choice, that is un-
likely to enhance consumer welfare to any significant extent.
Part I provides a brief overview of private ordering concepts and
identifies some situations in which private ordering functions displace,
and are sometimes displaced by, regulatory intervention. Part II ad-
dresses the structure of the payment card industry and a summary of
critical incentives favoring security among those who participate in the
payment card network, as well as identifying some limitations in those
incentive structures that may result in externalized costs. Part III ex-
amines the current state of data security standards (PCI DSS) and
enforcement of those standards using private ordering principles. Part
IV assesses several incursions into this private ordering regime, in-
cluding legal requirements for disclosure when breaches occur, gener-
alized sanctions by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for unsecure
behavior, and attempts to create new legal pathways for reallocating
breach-related costs within the network. Part V summarizes research
and policy issues and concludes with observations about government
intervention in this dynamic technological environment.
I. PRIVATE ORDERING IN A PUBLIC CONTEXT
Private ordering occurs ubiquitously in market economies in which
individuals and firms have incentives to optimize their respective ben-
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efits from yet unregulated or emerging economic relationships.
Within the realm of contract, parties negotiate to achieve mutual ben-
efits through exchanges, which generally may be tailored freely to ad-
dress their particular needs and expectations. At its most basic level,
law provides a basis for transactional security, which confirms that ex-
pectations reflected in an executory agreement will indeed be
fulfilled.10
Law may also intervene to affect the content of private agreements
by constraining the terms for agreement, thereby reflecting communal
norms for expected behavior instead of leaving such matters to private
negotiation. Doctrines of good faith and unconscionability are exam-
ples of this form of intervention." In this way, law defines the outer
limits of private ordering, providing a boundary that channels behav-
ior toward desirable ends and away from undesirable ones, while pre-
serving autonomous decision-making as the primary mechanism for
governing behavior.
Constraints are often imposed when private ordering fails to pro-
duce socially desirable outcomes. For example, concerns about dis-
parities in bargaining power and the economic necessity of formal
contracts in consumer transactions have provided the basis for legisla-
tion injecting ex ante restrictions into agreements for the stated pur-
pose of protecting consumer interests.12 Political concerns about the
public consequences when private ordering fails may also trigger some
additional government involvement in the private regime.13 However,
regulators must possess considerable knowledge of the economic rela-
tionships within an industry in order to draft effective rules. Govern-
10. See, e.g., John 0. Haley, Why Study Japanese Law?, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (2010) ("Few
indeed dispute that wealth-generating activity requires sufficient political stability and a social
environment in which individuals acting with others are willing and able to invest effort and
assets in anticipation of economic gain. Political stability is a necessary but insufficient condi-
tion. Equally necessary are transactional security and assurance that future returns will not be
confiscated, i.e., protection of contract and property. Confidence in legal recognition and pro-
tection of property encourages investment in wealth-generating enterprises. Similar assurance
of legal enforcement of contracts in turn fosters exchange and transactions among strangers.
These features taken together, the argument goes, help to explain why economic activity appears
to flourish best in stable political orders in which private law systems function.").
11. See generally Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Indi-
vidual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REv. 647 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Rick Fischer et al., The New Credit Card Rules, 65 Bus. LAW. 537 (2010) (discuss-
ing legislative and regulatory requirements for credit card lending). See also Oren Bar-Gill, The
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 Mim. L. REV. 749 (2008) (arguing that in
some cases sellers may strategically respond to consumer mistakes, justifying legal intervention).
13. See Nagy, supra note 5, at 977-78; see also Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 347 ("Where public
confidence in the legitimacy of a privately ordered scheme is shaken, governmental delegation
should be scrutinized to determine whether it can make the private ordering more efficient.")
(second emphasis added).
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ment regulators must either develop this knowledge internally, or they
can rely on other sources for that expertise, effectively co-opting rules
or standards developed through private ordering and converting them
into public laws. 14 Courts, in particular, may rely on practices and
customs in interpreting rules in commercial settings, reflecting the phi-
losophy of Karl Llewellyn that the law must reflect commercial
realities.15
Alternatively, in lieu of specific rules, government may also use
more generalized approaches, which require discretionary interven-
tion to constrain behaviors that may be undesirable or unfair, such as
the FTC's pursuit of "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 16 Such an approach allows government power to respond
to the most egregious cases of behavior which might otherwise not fall
within existing legal regimes, while at the same time allowing rules to
develop over time, taking into account changed circumstances and
conditions. However, these approaches also present risks associated
with discretionary justice, where the expected certainty and predict-
ability-hallmarks of the rule of law-may compromise the interests
of those being regulated.17
In addition to substantive rules, the process for resolving disputes
may also leave room for private ordering. Lawsuits provide a public
means to call attention to allegations of behavior that breaches legal
norms.18 In this sense, they serve important functions that may im-
14. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 5, at 313 ("PCAOB began its mission by adopting a
substantial body of GAAS promulgated by the AICPA.").
15. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to
the Opportunism Problem, 39 CONN. L. REV. 451, 453-54 (2006).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2010). Twenty-eight states have adopted similar legislation,
known as "Little FTC Acts." See David L. Belt, Should the FTC's Current Criteria for Determin-
ing "Unfair Acts or Practices" be Applied to State "Little FTC Acts"?, 9 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1
(2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/
Febl0_FullSource2_..25.authcheckdam.pdf.
17. See Belt, supra note 16, at 4-5. In 1994, Congress enacted 15 U.S.C. § 45(n), which denies
the Commission authority to declare a practice as unfair "unless the act or practice causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." Id.
at 4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). Although this may provide a constraint on administrative
power, such balancing still entails considerable uncertainty for those affected. See id. at 5. See
also Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and "Clear Reflection of Income": What
Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 461 (1999) ("[D]esirability of rule-
based decisionmaking depends in part on which is trusted (or feared) most: government deci-
sionmakers (with the potential to violate individual rights through discretion) or citizens (with
the potential to exploit weakness in rules to the detriment of the common good).").
18. See Haley, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that "a lawsuit may function more as a public signal
of untrustworthiness than as a legal remedy").
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prove the quality of law itself.19 However, many lawsuits are settled
under terms that preclude disclosure, reflecting a preference for pri-
vate ordering over public justice. To some extent, this may reflect
concerns about losing control of the outcome to a disinterested third
party,20 as well as other prudential factors affecting risk
management. 21
Thus, the dispute resolution process may also be privatized-in-
deed, this has become a common provision in contractual arrange-
ments. Scholars have identified several reasons for these practices.
Private dispute resolution may achieve timeliness that overburdened
public forums cannot deliver.22 It may also provide decision-makers
with particular expertise in these kinds of disputes, which may not be
readily available in the hands of generalist judges.23
In international contexts, private dispute resolution also solves the
problem of sovereignty, claims from competing jurisdictions, and in
this way serves the needs of parties whose activities transcend geo-
graphic borders. 24 Such transcendence may not be complete, to the
extent that legal regimes may indeed be invoked by a dissatisfied
party.25 Nevertheless, the promise of private ordering in this regard
has been realized considerably in matters of international trade.
Moreover, as discussed below, this feature of private ordering also has
promise in the realm of payment systems, which often span geo-
graphic borders.
19. See generally Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). This
seminal essay, which is controversial in ADR circles, was recently the subject of a symposium
celebrating the 25th anniversary of its publication. See Owen Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1273 (2009). See also Peter L. Murray, Privatization of Civil Justice, 15 WIL-
LAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 133, 134 (2007).
20. See, e.g., Ronald Lee Gilman, Resolving Commercial Cases through Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1996); David J. McLean & Sean-Patrick Wilson,
Compelling Mediation in the Context of Med-Arb Agreements, 63 Disp. REs. J. 28 (2008) ("In
most situations, it is in the best interest of the parties to amicably resolve their disputes during
the mediation step and avoid the cost of arbitration and losing control over the outcome of their
case.").
21. See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudica-
tion, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 533 (2009) (discussing hedging and risk-assessment considerations
in valuation of litigation rights and the impact on settlement).
22. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 19, at 152 (noting "rapid finality" as a claimed advantage of
arbitration).
23. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 454 (2007) ("[T]here is reason to
believe that disputants seeking an accurate outcome might fare better in arbitration, particularly
where the arbitration involves a diverse panel of subject-matter experts.").
24. See Drahozal, supra note 1, at 1037 (discussing "Law Merchant" concepts in international
arbitration). It should be noted, however, that Drahozal also concludes that national law is still
used widely in international arbitration panels. Id. at 1038-39.
25. See id. at 1040 (noting that public courts play an important role in enforcement).
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II. SECURITY, SANCTIONS, AND SELF-INTEREST IN THE PAYMENT
CARD INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
Private ordering has played a crucial and ongoing role in the devel-
opment of payment cards as a significant mechanism for payment.
Private systems of regulation have developed to induce consumers'
and merchants' trust and confidence in transacting payments through
these networks, with only minimal interference in matters of data se-
curity. As discussed below, self-interested behavior has induced com-
mercial participants to join together in creating a trustworthy
environment.
The payment card industry provides a valuable intermediary service
between consumers (cardholders) and the merchants who accept
cards for payment (merchants). 26 Although variations in the structure
for delivering and marketing payment card services occur within the
industry,27 the principal relationships within the network are illus-
trated in Figure 1, below. 2 8
Trustworthiness is critical for participation in both the merchant and
consumer markets for payment card services. Merchants require as-
surance that they will receive payment for their goods and services.
Consumers require assurance that merchants will accept this form of
payment and that they are liable only for authorized charges. By pro-
viding this assurance, immense benefits occur within the economy for
participants. For example, consumers and merchants alike avoid se-
curity and transaction costs associated with cash; they also benefit
from reduced transaction costs for credit, which likely generate addi-
tional completed transactions. The network of trust relationships in-
herent in the industry is illustrated in Figure 2, below, An Anatomy of
PCI DSS.
The sheer volume of card-based transactions in the United States-
more than three trillion dollars in 2009-speaks to their utility.29 Al-
though economically difficult to assess the independent value created
by this payment medium, commentators have estimated that if it ap-
26. See generally Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust
Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941 (2007).
27. See Edward A. Morse & Vasant Raval, PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards in Context, 24 COMPUTER L. & SECURrry REP. 540, 541 (2008) (discussing unitary and
non-unitary systems), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1303122.
28. See id. at 542.
29. Credit card purchases totaled $1.76 trillion; debit card and prepaid card purchases totaled
$1.63 trillion. See Russell Huebsch, Risks of Debit Cards for Businesses, Hous. CHRON. (Feb.
2010) (citing Nilson Report), http://smallbusiness.chron.com/risks-debit-cards-businesses-104.
html; see also PCI Compliance ... What Does It Mean?, SALONSPA BLOG (Apr. 20, 2010), http://
salonspabestpractices.com/102/#_ednref2 (citing Nilson Report, Feb. 2010).
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Figure 1. Overview of Payment Card Industry Relationships
proaches even a modest five percent of this three trillion dollar vol-
ume ($150 billion), it will far exceed the total costs incurred from such
ancillary consequences as identity theft.30 Alternatively, market value
associated with card brands also shows their economic significance, as
the combined market capitalization for the four largest firms, Ameri-
can Express, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa, totaled more than $180
billion in April 2010.31 Indeed, the payment card industry has earned
its own economic identity within financial services, and those in
charge of its governance should be justifiably concerned about the
protection of its market capitalization.
30. See William Roberds & Stacey L. Schreft, Data Security, Privacy, and Identity Theft: The
Economics Behind the Policy Debates, 33 ECON. PERSP. 22, 24 (2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1341223.
31. See David S. Evans, The Card Networks: Stealthy Tigers or Deer in the Headlights? Pyrs.
coM (Apr. 29, 2010, 3:58 PM), http://www.pymnts.com/the-card-networks-stealthy-tigers-or-
deer-in-the-headlights/?nl.
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Figure 2. An Anatomy of PCI DSS
-Coordinates an
environment of Oiopl
The assurance that consumers require for participation comes pri-
marily from contract. In order to induce consumer trust, card issuers
have aggressively promoted consumer protection from fraudulent
transactions, offering zero liability for transactions within the net-
work. 32 Congress has enacted federal laws to require that consumers
bear no more than fifty dollars in liability for fraudulent transac-
tions,33 but the fact that payment card firms offer consumers more
than is federally mandated under these laws suggests that competition
for customers drives the industry to act in favor of consumer well-
32. See, e.g., Zero Liability for Lost and Stolen Cards, MASTERCARD, http://www.mastercard.
us/zero-liability.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Master Card Liability]; Visa Security
Program, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa-security-program/zero-liability.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012).
33. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1) (2006) (limiting cardholder liability for
unauthorized credit card charges to $50); Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a)
(2006) (limiting consumer losses for debit cards).
223
224 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. 10:213
being. 34 Self-interest produces this result: if consumer fears regarding
unauthorized charges induce them not to use their cards, the payment
card industry makes no profits.
Fraudulent transactions do occur, and these transactions impose
costs within the payment card network. When lost or stolen card in-
formation is used, someone other than the legitimate cardholder must
bear the loss. Typically this cost is borne by the merchant who accepts
the card for payment. When a customer disputes a charge, the bank
issuing the card (with whom the consumer has a contractual relation-
ship) reverses the charge and notifies the merchant's bank (sometimes
known as the acquiring bank) to return the funds pending the resolu-
tion of the dispute. Absent a signed sales receipt from the cardholder,
the merchant is likely to bear the loss.35 The merchant's bank (or "ac-
quiring bank") has two incentives to pass this cost along to the
merchant: (1) a short term incentive to avoid the immediate cost of
the charge-back, and (2) a long-term incentive to reduce the risks of
fraudulent behavior generally by incentivizing the merchants to en-
gage in proactive behavior.36 Merchants, in turn, will likely pass these
costs along to their customers, although competitive conditions may
constrain their ability to do so.3
Some fraud within the payment card industry can be attributed to
the fault of consumers who lose cards or related information through
their own unsecure behavior. For example, fraudulent email requests
(also known as "phishing attacks") have proven remarkably successful
in extracting data directly from consumers based on mistaken beliefs
about the nature of the disclosure.38 However, protections offered to
consumers in the United States are generally independent of con-
sumer fault, so long as they occur within the network. 39 In this sense,
34. It is curious that this phenomenon has been limited to the U.S. See Visa Security Program,
supra note 32, (noting that the zero liability policy "[clovers U.S.-issued cards only"). It is possi-
ble that legally-imposed low liability limit may be responsible for nudging card issuers toward
competing in a manner that favored consumers.
35. See generally Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 286-88 (2d
Cir. 2006). Losses may be particularly acute in so-called "card not present" transactions, includ-
ing transactions over the Internet. See also Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 543.
36. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 543. However, in some cases competitive conditions
to attract merchants may cause some banks to absorb these charges instead of passing them back
to their customers, though this is likely to be rare. Id. at n.36.
37. See id. at 544.
38. See Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phishing and Informa-
tion Theft, 13 J. INTERNET L. 10, 16 (2010).
39. However, the MasterCard policy includes a caveat that the customer must have "exercised
reasonable care in safeguarding your card from any unauthorized use," which means "you did
not provide, directly, by implication or otherwise, the right to use your card and you received no
benefit from the 'unauthorized' purchase." See Master Card Liability, supra note 32. Presuma-
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the framework for consumer protection departs from common law
standards of negligence, which traditionally reallocate losses based on
fault. However, the merchant community, which generally bears the
initial loss in these circumstances, may be a "superior risk bearer" if
not the "least-cost risk avoider" 4 0 in the sense that merchants are able
to protect themselves to some extent through security measures. If a
loss does occur, the merchant community can spread the cost more
effectively than an individual consumer. Nevertheless, some
merchants permit credit card payments without signatures or identifi-
cation on small transactions, presumably reflecting a business decision
that the benefits of speedy transactions are more important than mar-
ginal protections against chargebacks from capturing a signature.
Thus, merchants self-select cost spreading as a means of response.
Others accepting payments via the Internet are effectively forced to
accept payments without a signature, and presumably the competitive
conditions within this market allow them to engage in cost shifting for
the fraudulent charges they are likely to incur, although competition
with "brick and mortar" businesses not subject to these constraints
will presumably provide a limit on such shifting.
Other fraud cases result from the unsecure behavior of merchants,
processors, or other participants within the payment card network,
which permits hackers to obtain payment card data and perhaps other
personal information without the consumer's consent. Hackers have
accessed data from merchants in notorious cases (such as Hannaford
Grocery, TJ Maxx, and others) generating large scale instances of card
fraud.41 According to one source, hackers supposedly gathered infor-
mation from the TJ Maxx network for nearly two years before using
those accounts for fraudulent purposes, suggesting that criminals ap-
proach this activity scientifically in the manner of a business, rather
than as a random act of theft.42 Criminals routinely trade credit card
information for amounts ranging from $.10 to $25.00 per card number,
bly, this is intended to address matters such as children being allowed to use their parents' cards
for purchases, which the parent later chooses to disavow as "unauthorized."
40. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability: Exposing the Inferior
Risk-Bearer, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 287, 309-10 (2006) ("As a matter of policy, a better solution
allocates risk to the superior risk bearer or, alternatively, the least cost risk avoider"); James
Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 453, 454 (2004) (identifying party who takes stolen checks from a thief as the "least
cost risk avoider").
41. See generally Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 447-48.
42. See Patrick Gauthier, The Security Conundrum - Part 1: The Puzzle, PAYMENTS.COM
(Apr. 20, 2010, 6:24 AM), http://pymnts.com/the-security-conundrum-part-1-the-puzzle/.
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with one study estimating the total potential worth of credit cards sold
illicitly at $5.3 billion. 43
An unsecure merchant who inadvertently discloses the card infor-
mation presents a risk that such information may be used to commit
fraud at other merchants. As long as this fraud occurs in transactions
with other merchants within the payment card network, the card-
holder is protected from direct liability. However, by increasing the
vulnerability to fraud within the network, this unsecure behavior po-
tentially generates externalized costs for other merchants. Asymme-
tries may occur between the unsecure behavior and the additional
fraud risks exported to others. For example:
* Merchants that impose strict security measures on card users,
such as a robust authentication requirement, are less likely to be
targets for fraudulent behavior due to the threat of detection. In
contrast, merchants that rely on "card not present" transactions
or who dispense with signatures due to transaction volume con-
siderations face comparatively more risk.
* Merchants that sell products or services that can be cancelled
when the fraud is discovered (e.g., tuition for an academic degree
or warranty services that can be discontinued), would incur lim-
ited economic losses from fraud, as compared with those who
cannot retract or cancel a transaction post hoc.
* Merchants that sell goods or services with insignificant marginal
costs (e.g., books or music delivered electronically) would face
comparatively limited (out-of-pocket) economic consequences
for fraud in comparison with others who provide tangible goods
or services with significant marginal costs.
The payment card network provides additional incentives through
private ordering, which potentially correct these asymmetries between
the individualized assessments of costs and benefits for particular
merchants. As discussed in greater detail below, the network provides
the standards for expected security behavior; private firms, accredited
through private ordering, provide compliance monitoring; and
breaches are punished through fines imposed within the network.44
These measures to enhance security throughout the network are
rooted in shared incentives for broader payment card usage and pro-
43. See Rick Van Luvender, Fraud Trends in 2010: Top Threats from a Growing Underground
Economy, FIRST DATA 3 (2010), http://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-leadership/fraud
trends2010_wp.pdf.
44. Since these fines are imposed privately, their frequency and volume are not entirely
known, making their particular effectiveness difficult to evaluate. See Sasha Romanosky &
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspec-
tives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1077-78 (2009).
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tection of the card brand's reputation. As VISA has admitted in a
Form 10K filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), pay-
ment card breaches affect its reputation and profitability:
We, our customers, merchants and other third parties store card-
holder account information in connection with our payment cards.
In addition, our customers may use third-party processors to pro-
cess transactions generated by cards carrying our brands. Breach of
the systems on which sensitive cardholder data and account infor-
mation are stored could lead to fraudulent activity involving our
cards, reputational damage and claims against us. If we are sued in
connection with any data security breach, we could be involved in
protracted litigation. If unsuccessful in defending such lawsuits, we
may be forced to pay damages and/or change our business practices
or pricing structure, any of which could have a material adverse ef-
fect on our revenues and profitability. In addition, any reputational
damage resulting from an account data breach at one or more of
our customers, merchants or other third parties could decrease the
use and acceptance of our cards, which could have a material ad-
verse impact on our payments volume, revenues and future growth
prospects. Finally, any data security breach could result in addi-
tional regulation, which could materially increase our costs. 45
MasterCard has made similar disclosures, which also emphasize the
reputational costs and adverse impacts on transaction volumes from
increased fraud claims. 4 6
The above disclosures also indicate that costs imposed within the
network are not the only potential costs from a security breach.
Banks issuing payment cards may experience particularized costs as-
sociated with cancelling compromised cards and reissuing new ones.47
Moreover, consumers affected by identity theft may experience losses
outside the scope of the payment card network, so that the zero liabil-
45. Visa, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25-26 (Nov. 20, 2009).
46. MasterCard, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 39 (Feb. 18, 2010):
[Any damage to our reputation or that of our brands resulting from an account data
breach could decrease the use and acceptance of our cards, which in turn could have a
material adverse impact on our transaction volumes, revenue and future growth pros-
pects, or increase our costs by leading to additional regulatory burdens being imposed
upon us.
... Increased fraud levels involving our cards could lead to regulatory intervention,
such as mandatory card re-issuance, adoption of new technologies or enhanced security
requirements, and damage to our reputation and financial damage to our brands, which
could reduce the use and acceptance of our cards or increase our compliance costs, and
thereby have a material adverse impact on our business.
47. See, e.g., TJX, Financial Institution Plaintiffs Settle Claims in Breach of 46 Million Credit
Cards, 14 BNA ELEC. COMMERCE & L. REP. 1296 (2009) (discussing settlements in litigation
against merchant with payment card security breach, including substantial amounts to banks
required to issue new cards for those compromised by disclosure).
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ity protections applicable to unauthorized charges may not effectively
make them whole. 48
For the entire ecosystem and its participants, it is important to rec-
ognize that empirical evidence indicates that data breaches have re-
sulted in significant abnormal negative stock market returns in the
immediate and medium-term (one to two years) time horizons follow-
ing a firm's announcement of a breach.49 If investors punish an inse-
cure firm, recovery from such losses in market capitalization may take
a long time. This market reaction may provide an additional incentive
for security.
Whether regulated or private-ordered, protection from data
breaches is, and will remain, a key imperative in this industry. How-
ever, the content of the security standards and the nature of enforce-
ment measures utilized to ensure compliance within the industry
remain mostly within the realm of private ordering. Significant as-
pects of the private ordering regime of PCI DSS are discussed in Part
III, below, and significant legal incursions into that regime are ex-
plored in Part IV.
III. PCI DSS: PRIVATE ORDERING OF SECURITY
In this section, we discuss first the role of DSS in PCI. We contend
that DSS are an infrastructure in itself, providing multidimensional,
global support to the entire domain space. Second, we examine an
anatomy of the PCI DSS, which suggests significant bonding of secur-
ity as a system embedded within the PCI. Then we look at the strate-
gic goal of the PCI, via DSS, to maintain reputation through
established and ongoing trust in the system as a whole. We argue that
the security measures are designed only to achieve stable trust levels;
that is, security is not the ultimate objective, trust is. DSS have
emerged cooperatively as a socioeconomic system that is highly de-
pendent on technology, and that dependence suggests a continuing
48. See SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - 2006 IDENTITY THEFr SURVEY REPORT
3-6 (2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportlDTheft2006.pdf (estimating the
median costs incurred in connection with frauds committed by opening new accounts as forty
dollars per consumer and the median value of goods and services obtained by thieves in this
context was $1,350). However, the report also notes that consumers are unlikely to bear fraud
costs directly due to legal protections operating in their favor. See id. at 6, n.5.
49. See Edward A. Morse, Vasant Raval, & John R. Wingender, Jr., Market Price Effects of
Data Security Breaches, 20 INFo. SEC. J. 263 (2011). While these results held true for breaches
affecting a database of public companies, they did not hold true among all subcategories of this
database. Id. Stock prices for financial services and industrial firms were both affected, but
retailers were apparently not affected. See id. at 269-72. Further, responses may also vary based
on the type of breach. Hacking generated no significant impact, but stolen laptops or other
fraudulent access generated more significant results. See id.
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role for cooperative standard setting for the foreseeable future. A
schematic showing the private ordering construct built into the PCI is
shown in Figure 3, below.
Figure 3. The Private Ordering Construct in the PCI
A. DSS in PCI: A Brief History
Five card brands: American Express, Visa, Master Card, Discover,
and JCB worked together to release Data Security Standards on De-
cember 15, 2004. Prior to launching this cooperative venture, each
card brand followed its own security "standard" in contractual rela-
tionships with entities within its network. PCI DSS as a unified frame-
work aimed to improve coordination across entities involved,
harmonize expectations, and improve efficiency through shared secur-
ity expertise. However, that coordination could also tend to reduce
interbrand competition over security features.50
50. Collusion on matters regarding security would be expected to generate consumer welfare
if the outcomes resulted in fewer fraud claims than under a competitive regime. The oligopolis-
tic nature of card brand cooperation here may present antitrust concerns (which are avoided
under U.S. law to the extent that cooperative behavior is the product of regulation, rather than
private ordering), but they are beyond the scope of this article. For additional discussion, see
Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Con-
certed Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REv. 325, 327 (2009).
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The PCI DSS framework is organized into a set of twelve related
"requirements" further classified into over 300 sub-requirements in its
current version. Non-linear in nature, each of these applies at a differ-
ent level; for example, network level, communication level, and appli-
cation level. The original security framework announced in
December 2004 (Version 1.0) was revised in September 2006 (Version
1.1) to provide clarification to Version 1.0 and incorporate minor revi-
sions. Released in October 2008, Version 1.2 replaced Version 1.1 ef-
fective 2009; however, this new version did not change any of the
requirements. Rather, it improved clarity, accommodated greater
flexibility in compliance modes, and addressed evolving risks and
threats, including issues involving wireless networks deployed for pay-
ment processing. In August 2009, the revised version 1.2.1 was an-
nounced, primarily to effect minor corrections and improve
consistency between the requirements and supporting documents.
The PCI Data Security Council (PCI DSC) launched a revised ver-
sion of the standards, V2, in October 2010. Contrary to expectations,
this much anticipated pronouncement did not change much. Numer-
ous revisions were in the spirit of clarification, to ensure that concise
wording portrayed the desired requirements. For example, several
clarifications addressed the timing, extent, or documentation of test-
ing procedures. Comparatively few revisions substantively modified
compliance obligations. For example, V2 provided more examples of
risk assessment methodologies. A third category of revisions, called
Evolving Requirements (formerly, Enhancements) included changes
to ensure that the DSS are up to date with emerging threats and
changes in the market. Only one Evolving Requirement was present
in V2, making it obligatory to (1) rank identified vulnerabilities ac-
cording to risk, and (2) test the procedure to address high-risk vulner-
abilities. The Council noted that this evolving requirement of
identification and ranking of high risk vulnerabilities is considered a
best practice. This remains a best practice until June 30, 2012, after
which it becomes a requirement.51
The payment card industry today is a thriving business, with com-
bined market capitalization for the four largest firms, American Ex-
press, Discover, MasterCard, and Visa, totaling more than $180
billion.52 MasterCard, the first of these firms to issue stock to the pub-
lic, recently sold for nearly five times the IPO price from only four
51. PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY STAN-
DARD 39 (2010), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/pci-dss-v2.pdf.
52. See Evans, supra note 31.
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years ago 53-a testament to the market's assessment of the promise
for growth inherent in these enterprises.
The role of PCI DSS seems central to this growth, as the perception
of security represents an inherent characteristic of an effective pay-
ment system. In this regard, private ordering tends to follow logical
boundaries, not legal ones. Implementation spans global networks
that transcend national boundaries, requiring the emergence of a so-
phisticated infrastructure. Specification of security requirements, in-
terpretation of standards and implementation within particular
systems, and the testing and certification of such systems for compli-
ance, have generated a large and growing economy within the indus-
try. A network of qualified private firms has emerged, which are
devoted to assisting organizations with implementation of the DSS
and to certify continued compliance for the benefit of the network. 5 4
Figure 4, below, illustrates in some detail the various relationships
within the DSS infrastructure.
While such elaborate and impressive infrastructure and attendant
ecosystem is impressive in all aspects, advocates of regulation who
wish to not rely on this extralegal mechanism may have cause for con-
cern. For example, the requirements are set by the PCI DSC, but re-
sponsibility for managing the PCI DSS compliance program has been
given to the acquirers and acquiring banks, which contract with their
respective merchants.55 While this may make logical and practical
sense (due to privity of contract), acquirers may not fully implement
compliance burdens to the extent that they conflict with the acquirers'
interest to generate fees from those same merchants. 5 6 An additional
concern exists with the certification process embedded within the PCI
DSS infrastructure. The common control of certification and training
of assessors may generate conflict of interest issues to the extent that
the same entity performs standard-setting and certification
responsibilities.
53. See id.
54. For example, Visa publishes and maintains a "Global List of PCI DSS Validated Service
Providers" (as of 5/5/2010) that lists firms who have validated compliance with PCI DSS, along
with the Qualified Security Assessor (QSA) responsible for the firm certification. See Visa's
Global Registry of Service Providers, VISA (Oct. 13, 2010), http://usa.visa.com/download/
merchants/cisp-list-of-pcidss-compliant-service-providers.pdf.
55. Alex Woda, Achieving Compliance with the PCI Data Security Standard, 4 ISACA J. 46,
47 (2007), http://www.isaca.org/Journal/Past-Issues/2007/Volume-4/Pages/Achieving-Compli-
ance-With-the-PCI-Data-Security-Standardl.aspx.
56. For example, size-based constraints may represent a practical economic consideration that
balances the desirability of access to the network against the compliance burdens that could limit
participation by smaller firms. See infra note 62.
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Figure 4. The PCI DSS Infrastructure
Enforce
vendors
KEY:
ASV - Approved Scanning Vendor
DSS - Data Security Standards
PA - Payment Application
PCI - Payment Card Industry
PED - Pin Entry Device
PIN - Personal identification Number
OSA - Qualified Security Assessor
SAO - Self Assessment Questionnaire
B. Maintaining Trust within the PCI
The PCI Security Standards Council affirms that it set DSS with a
view to provide technical and operational requirements to protect
cardholder data.57 The SSC does not refer to the establishment of
marketwide trust across stakeholders as an overall intent of the stan-
dards, but this is understandable. A notion of trust is a behavioral
57. See PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security-standards/index.php (last visited May 10, 2010).
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phenomenon, involving the psyche of participants across the indus-
try.58 Trust is affected by cost-benefit considerations, in which eco-
nomic benefits from a convenient payment option are balanced
against the costs allocated to participants. The DSS framework pro-
vides an important contribution through attempting to outline broad
security requirements, which facilitate trust. But when these security
requirements fail, trust can also be buttressed by other industry prac-
tices, such as assurances limiting consumer liability. In this regard,
one might surmise that the industry attempts to keep its infrastructure
in balance so that consumer trust is preserved even when occasional
data security breaches actually occur.
Covered entities may fall out of compliance at any time. Implemen-
tation of PCI DSS does not necessarily preclude data security com-
promises. New threats to emerging vulnerabilities will continue to
surface. An entity otherwise compliant with PCI DSS may not have
yet addressed changes within the security environment, including the
evolving capabilities of criminals to circumvent controls. Therefore, it
is only superficial to think of the aim of PCI DSS as a bulletproof
security framework. Nevertheless, failures draw claims for a review of
the extralegal mechanisms operating within the PCI DSS to ensure
that affected parties are treated fairly.
C. Life-Cycle Stages of PCI and Their Relation to DSS
Technology and Innovation
The private ordering system within PCI is embedded within a socio-
technical system that governs the market and drives its behavior. The
payment card-or its logical equivalent-is the key to its operation.
In turn, the accompanying information technology provides transac-
tional assurance. The only thing constant about such technology is
change, which makes security a moving target. Securing cardholder
data was much easier in a relatively closed system with a well-defined
perimeter and known exit and entry points, which existed prior to the
Internet. However, systems now interface generally with a world of
58. See Vasant Raval & Ashok Fichadia, RISKS, CONTROLS, AND SECURITY 154-55 (Wiley
2007). As Raval and Fichadia observe,
[S]ecurity is an either-or proposition. [Slome system, software, or process is either se-
cured or not secured. On the other hand, degrees of trustworthiness can be defined
and used. The source of security is the presenter, who can claim to be secured or not
secured, whereas trust is a property of the sender, who makes implicit claims for want-
ing to be trusted. Products, processes or systems can be claimed to be secured (or not
secured); in contrast, evidence and analysis can lead to judgment as to trustworthiness
of such objects or entities.
Id. at 154-55.
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loosely connected, largely unsecure, networks. The introduction of
wireless networks presented new risks, which did not exist in
hardwired systems. As cloud computing practices emerge, moving the
locus of data from the source to third-parties and public clouds, addi-
tional players in the PCI domain may bear responsibility for security,
adding to the complexity in this environment. 59
Thus the industry faces an essential challenge of addressing security
needs in this dynamic environment. The PCI Data Security Council is
currently charged with the task of promulgating standards that take
into account this technological dynamism. As shown in Figures 3 and
4, above, PCI DSS include structure, process, and information (i.e.,
the standards). Although cooperative rulemaking is readily seen in
the development of the industry-wide standards, structures and
processes for implementation are generally handled by the brands
independently (see Figure 4). These also reflect the imprint of private
coordination and development within each brand network, with the
potential for variation among the card brands.
This current stage of cooperative security development in standard
design could change in the event that a payment card brand indepen-
dently develops or acquires new applications that enhance security. It
is even possible that the payment card system could become obsolete
with the development of alternative approaches to payments. As
commentators have noted, the ubiquity of the Internet on our iPods,
smart phones, automobiles, and televisions suggests that neat distinc-
tions between payment transactions occurring in brick-and-mortar en-
vironments and online environments may be disappearing.60 Recent
acquisitions of firms providing online payment solutions by payment
card brands suggest that competition still exists, particularly in the on-
line environment, despite the cooperative ventures for payment card
security.61 By acquiring innovation from others in the marketplace,
one member of the card brand oligopoly may indeed break out from
the pack.
59. See Vasant Raval, Risk Landscape of Cloud Computing, 1 ISACA J. 26, 30 (2010), http://
www.infotex.com/portal-blog/white-papers/risklandscape-ofcloud_computing-isaca.pdf.
60. See Evans, supra note 31 ("The internet will become like the electric power grid-some-
thing that almost every device is plugged into. The corollary is that it will be meaningless to talk
about internet-payment providers, such as PayPal, as if they were an interesting group of
foreigners.").
61. See David S. Evans, The Web Payment Wars Begin with Visa's Purchase of CyberSource?
PYMTs.com (Apr. 22, 2010, 6:27 AM), http://pymnts.com/the-web-payment-wars-begin-with-
visa-s-purchase-of-cybersource/?nl. Evans argues that CyberSource, a leading e-payments pro-
vider, provides a fast and easy means to interface between customers and merchants with signifi-
cant security features, which will stir competition among networks in the online payment
markets.
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But for the time being, knowledge about security standards seems
to be shared within the industry through the PCI SSC. The ongoing
need to address changing technology presents a natural advantage for
industry actors immersed in industry experiences as compared with
government actors who are not. Constantly changing in complexity,
knowledge asymmetry between the regulated industry and those who
seek to regulate it presents significant challenges for government in-
tervention. Consequently, the DSS, along with attendant processes
and structures, are likely to remain intact for the foreseeable future,
even if government chooses to intervene through some form of addi-
tional regulation.
The industry has also been sensitive to cost issues in implementing
PCI DSS. While the development of standards and a compliance
monitoring infrastructure has occurred on a cooperative basis, each
card brand has made its own decisions about the implementation re-
quirements for merchants who accept their card brand. For example,
Visa divided merchant requirements into four tiers based on the num-
ber of transactions processed annually. Figure 5, below, summarizes
the tiers and their requirements. 62
As Figure 5 shows, only the largest firms-those with more than 6
million transactions-are subject to full annual compliance review by
an independent QSA. Smaller firms are allowed to self-assess, with
essentially no difference between firms in tiers 2 and 3, which have
from twenty thousand up to six million transactions. The smallest
firms, with fewer than twenty transactions, are subject to compliance
validation requirements set by their acquiring bank.
MasterCard imposes similar compliance burdens and merchant
tiers. Likewise, American Express imposes similar requirements on
tier 1 and 2 merchants, but it imposes tier 1 responsibilities on those
who process more than 2.5 million transactions and tier 2 responsibili-
ties on those who process from 50,000 to 2.5 million transactions. Dis-
cover, in contrast, takes a "risk-based approach" for validation, the
details of which are not disclosed.63 Card brands also reserve discre-
tion to impose additional requirements, as both VISA and Master-
Card may require a merchant who has experienced a breach to
comply with tier 1 requirements.64
62. See Compliance Validation Details for Merchants, Cardholder Information Security Pro-
gram, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk-management/cisp-merchants.html#anchor_2
(last visited May 12, 2010). See Important PCI Compliance Information for Merchants, NBD
ADVISORY, http://www.pciassessment.org/merchants.php (visited Jan. 11, 2012) (providing a
comparative approach to all card brands).
63. See id.
64. See id.
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Figure 5: Compliance Validation (VISA, Inc.)
Tier Transactions Requirements
1 >6 million Annual report by QSA
Quarterly network scan by ASV
Attestation of Compliance
2 1-6 million Annual SAQ
Quarterly network scan by ASV
Attestation of Compliance
3 20,000-1 million Annual SAQ
Quarterly network scan by ASV
Attestation of Compliance
4 < 20,000 Annual SAQ (recommended)
Quarterly network scan by ASV (if
applicable)
Compliance validation requirements set by
acquirer
Note:
QSA = Qualified Security Assessor
ASV = Approved Scan Vendor
SAO = Self-Assessment Questionnaire
The industry thus chooses to direct the greatest compliance efforts
toward securing the greatest number of transactions. In the process, it
allows considerable latitude for small firms, for which compliance
costs per transaction could be economically more burdensome. Bas-
ing the compliance burdens on transaction volume, which functions as
a proxy for firm size, appears to take into account the significant costs
associated with becoming PCI DSS compliant and maintaining that
status. As reported in the PCI DSS Compliance Blog, top-level firms
spent, on average, $2.7 million to become compliant in 2008, excluding
the cost of PCI assessment services, which amounted to $237,000.65 In
contrast, second level merchants spent an average of $1.1 million to
become compliant and $135,000 for assessment. Level three
merchants spent only $155,000 to become compliant. No data was col-
lected from level four merchants. 66 Larger firms presumably have a
greater capacity to bear these substantial security costs than their
65. See Cost of PCI Compliance, PCI DSS COMPLIANCE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2009), http://blog.
elementps.comlelement-payment-solutions/2009/02/pci-compliance-costs.html%20.
66. Id. (It is unclear how the levels reported in this study map to those of the varying card
brands).
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smaller counterparts. However, by choosing to include smaller
merchants within the network, they have made a conscious decision-
a business decision-to tolerate lower levels of security in the interest
of obtaining higher market penetration and a more pervasive payment
card network.67
Thus, to summarize, the private ordering mechanisms within the
payment card industry are complex and have emerged to serve not
only consumer interests, but also the interests of the commercial par-
ticipants in the payment card network. These various relationships
are summarized in Figure 6, below. Given the nature of private order-
ing solution-an extralegal mechanism with an elaborate set of
processes, structures, and information-it is critical for the lawmakers
to proceed with care. While a replacement of the entire mechanism in
toto would appear impractical, incursions that tinker with parts of the
infrastructure and its attendant incentives could produce poor or in-
complete solutions leading to dysfunctional or unintended conse-
quences. The knowledge asymmetry between those inside the
industry and those outside, combined with the need for requisite vari-
ety and the management of an elaborate infrastructure in light of
changing technology, are powerful reasons for the law to promote and
support the private ordering solution. As discussed below, one do-
main that the legal system should address and align involves disclo-
sure requirements in relation to breaches of cardholder data security.
Figure 6. Foundations of Private Ordering within the PCI
t to i nT
Creates
67. The question may also be raised whether the political clout of this group of small busi-
nesses may have also spurred the policy of differential treatment in order to avoid regulation
that may have imposed additional costs.
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IV. LEGAL INCURSIONS ON PRIVATE ORDERING: AN ASSESSMENT
As discussed above, economic incentives within the payment card
network have provided the primary impetus for securing that net-
work. However, assessments of PCI DSS suggest that significant non-
compliance exists within the merchant community, often discovered
after data breaches. A 2009 study by Verizon Business indicated that
eighty-one percent of the victims of data security breaches were not
PCI DSS compliant. 68 A 2009 survey by the Ponemon Institute sug-
gests that only twenty-two percent of firms are fully compliant across
the enterprise, while twenty-eight percent are compliant for "most ap-
plications and databases" and twenty-five percent are compliant for
"some applications and databases"; the remaining twenty-five percent
are noncompliant. 69
Data security breaches have continued to occur after the promulga-
tion of PCI DSS, and those testifying in hearings before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity,
and Science and Technology in early 2009 rehearsed a litany of
breaches involving gaps in PCI DSS compliance. 70 This is no surprise.
Policymakers need to understand the impossibility of constructing a
completely secure network and maintaining it in that state. However,
technologists could construct a network that is sufficiently trustworthy
to serve the needs of users.71 One can always take steps to enhance
security, but such steps could impinge upon system functionality and
usability, and are not cost free. The incidence of those costs, and their
magnitude, deserves careful attention before intervening in the sub-
stance and procedure for security within a complex network. The dis-
cussion below evaluates significant examples of legal intervention and
their effects on the private ordering regime.
68. VERIZON Bus. RISK TEAM, 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (2009), http://
www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreachrp.pdf.
69. PONEMON INST. LLC., 2009 PCI DSS COMPLIANCE SURVEY (2009), http://www.ponemon.
org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/PCI%20DSS%20Survey%2Key%20Findings%
20FINAL4.pdf. It should be noted that these responses reflected approximately equal weighting
from merchants in tiers one through four, thus reflecting a significant proportion of small firms
in these compliance results. Given that high fixed costs make compliance economically difficult
for small firms, these figures are likely to overstate the risk of insecurity. The percentage of total
transactions that are secured would provide a more reliable indicator of overall security.
70. Do the Payment Card Industry Data Standards Reduce Cybercrime?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, & Sci. & Tech. of the H. Comm. Homeland Sec.,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rep. Yvette Clarke, Member, Subcommittee Chairwoman).
71. See VISA, supra note 54.
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A. Disclosure Requirements
In the United States, the federal government has generally taken a
sectoral approach to legislating protections for consumer privacy,
thereby departing significantly from the comprehensive data protec-
tion regime found in the European Union.72 In this environment, the
states have provided important leadership through legislation aimed
at protecting the interests of consumers whose personal data may be
disclosed. The imposition of disclosure requirements in connection
with data security breaches has become a widely adopted practice
under state law.
California started the trend toward disclosure requirements by en-
acting the first security breach notification law in 2002.73 Oddly, the
data breach that is credited with precipitating California's legislative
response involved a government agency leaking state payroll informa-
tion, where the agency delayed notification to the affected employees
for several weeks.74 Government failure, rather than a failure in the
private sector, served as the catalyst for legislation.75
As of October 12, 2010, forty-six states plus the District of Colum-
bia have enacted some form of data security breach notification law.7 6
Although there are differences in the particulars of these laws, they
commonly require breaching firms (including government entities) to
notify affected persons whenever their unencrypted personal informa-
tion 77 is believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person.78
72. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 545 (citing Thomas J. Smedinghoff, It's All About
Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Obligations in Global Privacy and E-Transactions Law,
16 MICH. ST. J. Irrr'L L. 1, 16 (2007).
73. See Jane K. Winn, Are "Better" Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1133 (2009).
74. See id. at 1142-43.
75. Id. at 1143-44. As government lacks the private sector motivations for security that are
rooted in reputational sanctions and other means of private ordering, a stronger argument may
exist for public laws focusing on government behavior regarding data security than in the private
sector. Id.
76. See State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGIs. (last updated
Oct.12, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearchlTelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/
SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx. Only Alabama, Kentucky, New Mex-
ico, and South Dakota have not joined in these legislative efforts. See id.
77. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2008):
For purposes of this section, "personal information" means an individual's first name or
first initial and last name in combination with any one or more of the following data
elements, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: (1) Social
security number. (2) Driver's license number or California Identification Card number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any required
security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual's fi-
nancial account. (4) Medical information. (5) Health insurance information.
78. See id. § 1798.82(a) (West 2008):
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Generally speaking, the state laws require direct notice unless the bus-
iness demonstrates that the costs or scope of notification are particu-
larly extensive, or if the business does not have sufficient contact
information. 79 In that case, the state law permits notice by e-mail
(where possible) coupled with conspicuous posting of the notice on
the company's website and notification of statewide media, in lieu of
direct written communications.80
The disclosure statute adopted in California and followed by other
states effectively imposes a strict liability regime upon the breaching
party.81 This approach imposes direct costs associated with disclosure
upon the breaching firm, regardless of whether the firm had adequate
security in place to deter an expected attack and regardless of whether
the disclosure is likely to result in harm to the consumer. Some states
have modified this regime to construct a different triggering mecha-
nism, which exempts firms from disclosure if, after consultation with
law enforcement, they reasonably believe that the disclosure "will not
likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has
been acquired and accessed." 82
Disclosure requirements thus alter the incentive structure for data
security by imposing additional costs on firms that fail to protect their
customers.83 The direct costs of disclosure are exacted outside the re-
gime of private ordering. Of course, this assumes that firms comply
Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the
security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of
the data to any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or
is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. The disclo-
sure shall be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay,
consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, as provided in subdivision (c),
or any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the reason-
able integrity of the data system.
79. See, e.g., id. § 1798.82(g) (allowing substitute. notice where costs would exceed $250,000 or
more than 500,000 persons would be involved).
80. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(g)(3). The California statute allows firms to follow proce-
dures in their own information security policies that are consistent with the timing requirements
of the statute, thus recognizing that firms may undertake notification obligations as a result of
their own privacy policies or contracts with customers. See id. § 1798.82(h).
81. See Winn, supra note 73, at 1147.
82. See id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(b) (2008)).
83. See Priscilla M. Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and Approaches, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1123 (2009) ("Security breach notifications can be viewed as a mech-
anism for correcting that market imperfection [i.e., of underinvestment in security] by bringing
to the organization's attention the cost of not adequately protecting data.").
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with the legal obligation imposed upon them-a proposition that
some critics doubt.8
But private ordering is important here, too, as disclosure also
"hardens" the compliance regime within the payment card network.
Disclosure also tends to ensure that the card network becomes aware
of noncompliance, thus permitting the imposition of sanctions through
their own regime. Moreover, disclosure allows reputational sanctions
in the marketplace to function effectively. As noted in the 10-K re-
ports of the payment card firms, disclosures may include adverse
reputational effects, which go beyond the direct costs imposed on the
unsecure merchant.85 Consumers may choose not to deal with un-
secure merchants (at least using payment cards). A survey of 2,000
consumers published in 2008 indicates that sixty percent would blame
the online merchant if the consumer became an identity theft victim
after online shopping.86 This may not translate into lost sales in all
cases, however, as other studies have indicated forty percent of con-
sumers would consider terminating a retail customer relationship with
a firm that experiences a data breach, but only nineteen percent actu-
ally do so. 87
Moreover, to the extent that investors are sensitive to the costs that
the unsecure firm incurs, management may experience additional in-
centives to be attentive to protecting customer information. Though
customer information may not be perceived as an asset per se, the
potential to impose significant costs if this information is not ade-
quately protected should receive attention from management, much
like the attention devoted to securing other firm assets.8 8
84. Winn, supra note 73, at 1148-49. Professor Winn argues that "because enforcement of ...
[security breach notification laws] depends almost entirely on self-regulation by owners of
databases, then as a practical matter, organizations with good enough security policies to realize
that they have a problem are exposed to much greater liability than organizations that are truly
clueless." Id. at 1149. This may be true, but it would hardly be uncommon in a complex legal
environment that depends on voluntary compliance. More sophisticated actors can generally be
expected to be more aware of noncompliance, particularly when compliance obligations are
known by many persons within the organization. Whistleblower provisions, similar to those de-
signed to increase federal income tax compliance, may be particularly effective additions to the
public law dimensions in this area. Cf Edward A. Morse, Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement:
Using Inside Information to Close the "Tax Gap," 24 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2009).
85. See VISA, supra note 45.
86. See FIRST DATA COMP. INTELLIGENCE, CONSUMER ONLINE SHOPPING FEARS (June 7,
2008), www.firstdata.comlen-us/insights/consumer-online-shopping-fears-study. However, the
causal connection between identity theft and online shopping is often contestable. It can be
difficult to trace identity theft to a particular disclosure, particularly when unsecure behavior is
pervasive and it may include the consumer's own fault.
87. See Regan, supra note 83, at 1127.
88. See Edward Morse & Vasant Raval, PCIDSS and the Legal Framework for Security: An
Update on Recent Developments and Policy Directions, 1 LYDIAN PAYMENTS J. 31, 35-36 (Aug.
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Compliance costs for breaching firms are likely to be substantial,
but estimates have varied considerably. For example, the General Ac-
counting Office estimated notification costs averaging fifty-four dol-
lars per record breached in 2007, while a private study by the
Ponemon Institute in 2008 showed a cost of $197 per record
breached.8 9 As these costs arise due to discrete, firm-specific events,
affected firms would face difficulties in passing these on to consumers,
at least in the short run, assuming competitive conditions in their
product or service markets.
In theory, disclosure laws encourage notice to consumers of in-
creased probability of potential harm, which the firm would otherwise
prefer not to disclose. This may provide consumers with an opportu-
nity to take steps to protect themselves, such as monitoring credit re-
ports or placing a hold or freeze on the opening of new accounts.90
However, the potential harm to a consumer is uncertain and highly
speculative, making it difficult to determine whether responsive action
is appropriate. 91 As some commentators have pointed out, consumers
who terminate their relationship with a breaching firm and open a
new relationship with another firm may actually increase their risk
exposure by further spreading their personal information in the mar-
ketplace.92 Only a small percentage of consumers who were offered
credit protection and monitoring tools after one major breach took
advantage of those benefits, and many consumers simply ignore
breach notification letters.93 This may not be an irrational choice, as it
is far from clear that experts can trace data security breaches directly
to a criminal incident. Moreover, some consumers already take these
2010). However, a recent study by Hiscox suggests that a majority of Fortune 500 firms do not
comprehend these risks adequately in disclosures to the SEC. Id. at 36. See also Winn, supra
note 69, at 1135-36; Philip Keitel, Legislative Responses to Data Breaches and Information Secur-
ity Failures, 14 ELEc. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 1 (2009). Nevertheless, after litigation, risk
exposure from a data security breach may be required to be disclosed in filings with the SEC.
See, e.g., TJX Companies Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (Mar. 30, 2010) (noting settle-
ment in litigation over security breach, while denying wrongdoing).
89. See Winn, supra note 73, at 1149.
90. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 547.
91. See Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 44, at 1094. Recent case law has generally rejected
consumer claims based on the enhanced potential for identity theft as either failing to present an
"injury-in-fact" for purposes of legal standing to sue, or alternatively if deemed sufficient for
standing (which requires only a minimal standard), on the basis that there is an insufficient
injury for purposes of the underlying state law claim. See, e.g., Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc.,
671 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (dismissing class action for data security breach as failing
to present an injury-in-fact for purposes of standing, and alternatively for failing to state a claim
under Missouri law).
92. Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 44, at 1095.
93. See id. at 1097.
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steps to protect themselves from these risks by purchasing security
services from third parties, and personal disclosure to them presuma-
bly adds little to the protection they have already acquired through
contract.
Just as disclosure may be helpful to trigger enforcement efforts
within the card network, including fines or other sanctions, it may also
prove useful to others in the marketplace, including issuing banks that
may choose to take additional security steps. These additional secur-
ity steps might include cancelling and reissuing cards or modifying al-
gorithms to detect the "red flags" of fraud. Moreover, government
agencies (such as the FTC, as discussed below) may also use disclo-
sure as the basis for additional intervention. 94
While disclosure may be an important feature to reinforce both
reputational sanctions in the marketplace and internal sanctions in the
payment card networks, it may be possible to achieve these important
benefits while also lowering the costs of particularized notice to con-
sumers. To the extent that behavioral economic theory suggests that
consumers may not behave rationally with regard to the information
concerning a security breach, 95 limiting disclosure to public forums-
such as the company website-may be sufficient to allow network and
reputational sanctions to function effectively. By disclosing the con-
text of the breach, the market can presumably ascertain whether the
firm behaves responsibly with regard to security and punish it appro-
priately. Such an approach might enhance consumer welfare more
than one that imposes a "tax" or "penalty" on responsible and irre-
sponsible firms through personalized disclosures, which may not bene-
fit consumers.
Such an approach would not necessarily displace private ordering,
but would strengthen both the internal functions (i.e., within the card
network) and the market functions (i.e., reputational sanctions, partic-
ularly those that are reinforced through public securities markets) that
help to incentivize behavior. To the extent individual notice is impor-
tant to consumers, they could contract with private firms (for exam-
ple, credit monitoring services), thus providing a private solution that
is less costly and more efficient. Data security breach costs may also
become part of another private ordering regime-namely, insur-
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1096 ("[R]esearch in behavioral economics and behavioral decision making pro-
vides ample evidence that consumers are unable to conceive of all possible outcomes and risks of
data disclosures.").
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ance.96 For insured firms, an additional private actor-the insurer-
will also have an interest in monitoring security practices, thereby pro-
viding additional support for security enhancement.
The state-level disclosure regime outlined above has not yet been
displaced by a federal law that requires disclosure for security
breaches, though proposed legislation has been working its way
through Congress.97 Variation in requirements among the states po-
tentially creates significant problems for firms engaged in multijuris-
dictional business operations, which might be solved by uniform
requirements within a federal statute.98 Moreover, states have limited
geographic reach due to jurisdictional concerns for commerce. As dis-
cussed below, a federal solution may resolve these problems. How-
ever, federal preemption of state laws presupposes that a correct
solution has been designed-a contestable proposition based on the
analysis provided above.
B. Reallocating Externalized Costs
Parties dissatisfied with outcomes under the private ordering re-
gime have sought to reallocate their losses through litigation. The
payment card network does not offer direct contractual links between
all of the parties affected by a breach, thus providing an apparent limit
on the effectiveness of private ordering through contract.99 For exam-
ple, a bank that issues a payment card to a consumer may incur costs
associated with cancelling and reissuing a card because of disclosure
by a merchant. Although a payment card network may punish the
merchant for being unsecure (probably indirectly, through an agree-
ment with the merchant's acquiring bank which may impose a fine or
other sanctions), a payment card network has not required unsecure
merchants to indemnify the issuing banks for these costs.
Likewise, a consumer may experience ancillary costs outside the
network, such as lost time and frustration from contesting fraudulent
charges against his accounts. The consumer may not have any con-
tractual basis for recovering against the merchant who was responsible
for releasing cardholder data. Moreover, the consumer would face a
difficult task in proving causation on account of the merchant's un-
96. See Common Cyber Risks, INSURETRUST, http://insuretrust.com/casel.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2012) (providing an example from a firm selling insurance).
97. See infra Part IV(C).
98. See generally Regan, supra note 83 (providing an extensive discussion of the politics be-
hind federal legislative initiatives for data security breach disclosure laws).
99. See, e.g., Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc., 918 N.E. 2d 36 (Mass. 2009)
(finding no privity of contract between credit unions and retailer with data breach).
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secure behavior, as a lack of security does not necessarily produce
fraud.'oo
Litigation has proven to be a somewhat ineffective vehicle for de-
veloping an alternative legal path to recovering these losses, as courts
have rejected many such claims. However, legislation giving recourse
to issuing banks has emerged in three states: Minnesota, Nevada, and
Washington, albeit with very different approaches to the matter of as-
sessing liability and the expected levels of compliance to shield a
merchant from liability. Each of these legal paths is discussed below.
1. Litigation
In the litigation surrounding TJX's payment card data security
breaches, issuing banks sued TJX for the costs externalized to them,
which included cancelling compromised cards and reissuing new ones;
also, state attorneys general sued TJX under consumer protection
laws. The company has settled all claims. 01 Such settlements reflect
private ordering that is guided by public laws and public courts. How-
ever, the particular claims invoked in these cases suggest considerable
uncertainty as to the legal basis for recovery if these cases had contin-
ued to judgment.102
As courts have pointed out, contract is an inadequate basis for se-
curity obligations in this context, as there is no privity of contract be-
tween a merchant, such as TJX, and a bank issuing a payment card to
a retail customer that is used to pay the merchant.10 3 Tort also pro-
vides an inadequate basis for a claim because the economic loss doc-
trine commonly bars recoveries where damages are purely economic
and do not involve property damage or other physical injury.104
Consumer plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing the legal stand-
ing to bring suit, given that the existence of a breach does not necessa-
100. See Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 44, at 1094 ("[Flor a plaintiff, it is difficult to
prove that the harm originated from a particular instance of data breach: the victim may not be
even aware that his data was in the possession of a certain firm, may not know that his data has
been breached, and may not be able to connect the harm born to the actual breach-since his
data may have been available at the same time to many other merchants or third parties.").
101. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 547-49; Morse & Raval, supra note 88, at 32-35
(recounting in some detail the various cases arising under this breach).
102. See Morse & Raval, supra note 88, at 35 ("[Cloming out of this litigation, we are left with
considerable uncertainty from the judicial sector as to what standard of behavior is required with
regard to data security and the basis for a successful claim.").
103. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27, at 548-49 (indicating that the merchant's bank, which
provides processing services for customer payments, also lacks privity, as the court in TXJ
recognized).
104. See id.
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rily translate into actual damages.10 5 Moreover, the kind of damages
that should be cognizable in such actions remains controversial. In
recent litigation, a federal district court has submitted a certified ques-
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine to ascertain whether time
and effort alone sufficiently constitute an injury, and if so, whether
such economic harms could serve as the basis for recovery under ap-
plicable state law.106
Although courts have the capacity to fashion appropriate remedies
for legal wrongs, they seem poorly suited as forums for complex
rulemaking in a manner that could seriously displace private ordering.
Reallocating losses after a breach has occurred can incentivize pro-
phylactic behavior by merchants to enhance security for consumers
and others affected by payment card data breaches. However, the
facts presented by the litigants before the court limit the context for
rulemaking. This engenders a piecemeal development process, which
necessarily leaves the precise behavioral standard to development in
future cases.
2. Legislation
Legislative solutions to this problem have also emerged at the state
level. Three different approaches have emerged, and each provides a
useful learning tool with regard to the ultimate impact upon the data
security environment.
Minnesota. Minnesota was the first state to adopt legislation that
effectively protects issuing banks from costs incurred to protect card-
holders, including cancellation, reissuance, and notification. It also
protects banks from the costs of unauthorized transactions.107 This
weak standard for liability only requires a finding of liability when
breach occurs if the merchant retains customer information more than
48 hours after the transaction authorization.'08 This falls far short of
105. See id.; see also Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 44, at 1094 (noting causation and
proof issues); see also IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT, supra note 48, at 32 (noting the major-
ity of victims (fifty-six percent) did not know how their information was stolen).
106. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach, 671 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D. Me.
2009), cert. granted, 4 A.3d 492 (Me. 2010). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that
time and effort alone do not constitute a cognizable injury recoverable in an implied contract
claim. See In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 497-98 (Me.
2010). However, the First Circuit has ruled that an implied contract claim may go forward based
on damages from costs incurred for mitigation of risks, such as credit monitoring or card replace-
ment fees. See Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 165-66 (1st Cir. 2011).
107. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.64(3) (2007).
108. See id. § 325E.64(2).
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PCI DSS requirements. 109 However, by threatening significant liabil-
ity for a subset of behavior that may be deemed highly improper ac-
cording to emerging customary data security standards, this approach
sends a significant signal to merchants as to their need for appropriate
security. Perhaps for this reason, there are no exemptions for small
merchants built into this legislation, thereby subjecting all actors to
the potential threat of litigation.
Nevada. Nevada has enacted legislation that became effective Janu-
ary 1, 2010, to require either compliance with PCI DSS or encryption
in connection with the transmission of any payment card data.110 Sec-
tion 1 provides:
If a data collector doing business in this State accepts a payment
card in connection with a sale of goods or services, the data collec-
tor shall comply with the current version of the Payment Card In-
dustry (PCI) Data Security Standard, as adopted by the PCI
Security Standards Council or its successor organization, with re-
spect to those transactions, not later than the date for compliance
set forth in the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Stan-
dard or by the PCI Security Standards Council or its successor
organization.'
This legislation thus expressly adopts and brings in PCI DSS compli-
ance, including monitoring functions, as a matter of state law. Rather
than freezing the standards in time, it allows the industry to determine
what changes are required and the timetable for compliance.
Alternatively, this law provides that those who do not comply with
PCI DSS may not electronically transmit personal information or
move any storage device containing personal information "beyond the
logical or physical controls of the data collector" unless encryption is
used "to ensure the security of the information."1 2 This law fails to
prescribe the type of encryption required, leaving such matters unde-
fined. If a weak encryption standard is used, it is highly doubtful that
this would "ensure the security of the information" against a clever
attacker. Encryption involves a complex set of choices, including the
selection of end-points for data on the move, choice of algorithm, key
length, use of certificates in public key cryptography, and key manage-
109. See James T. Graves, Minnesota's PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty
of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1135-36 (2008).
110. NEv. REV. STAT. § 603A.215 (2010).
111. See id.; see also id. § 603A.030 (defining a "data collector" to include "any governmental
agency, institution of higher education, corporation, financial institution, or retail operator or
any other type of business entity or association that, for any purpose, whether by automated
collection or otherwise, handles, collects, disseminates or otherwise deals with nonpublic per-
sonal information").
112. See id. § 603.215(2)(a)-(b).
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ment approaches,'1 3 which potentially illustrate the problem of knowl-
edge asymmetry between legislators and the industry experts.
Although undefined encryption standards avoid the problem of en-
capsulating past technology into the legal standard, this approach
could also fail to achieve the protective goal intended for the statute.
Significantly, this legislation does not expressly provide a private
cause of action or impose a penalty for noncompliance. Nevada law
does empower the "data collector" to bring a civil action against a
person who unlawfully obtained or benefited from personal informa-
tion maintained by the data collector, thus permitting recovery against
unauthorized users.114 Damages may include costs incurred in notify-
ing its customers." 5 However, injunctive relief against the data collec-
tor is available only to the extent the attorney general or district
attorney has reason to believe the data protection requirements are
being violated. 16
When, as here, the legislature has spoken directly to the matter of
compliance and data security, query whether a court will interpret this
legislative behavior as expressing an intention to preclude the devel-
opment of further private remedies. To the extent any other private
causes of action may be developed, Nevada law asserts that compli-
ance with either the PCI DSS or encryption requirements provides a
shield against liability. However, in order to obtain this liability
shield, the data collector must show: "(a) The data collector is in com-
pliance with this section; and (b) [t]he breach is not caused by the
gross negligence or intentional misconduct of the data collector, its
officers, employees, or agents."117
By stating these requirements conjunctively, the liability shield may
be modest indeed for those seeking protection by PCI DSS compli-
ance. Compliance with PCI DSS may be certified at a given point in
time, but any change in circumstances following certification could
make a system fail to be in compliance, although not clearly recog-
nized or assessed as such. In that case, a breach occurring due to
some form of human error, even though not rising to the level of gross
negligence or intentional misconduct, could cause the data collector to
lose its shield. Moreover, this could occur without the knowledge of
113. See generally VASANT RAVAL & ASHOK FICHADIA, RISKS, CONTROLs, & SECURITY
120-68 (Wiley 2007).
114. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.900 (2006). Of course, this presupposes that the hacker is
identified and subject to jurisdiction in a court that will apply this law.
115. See id. § 603A.910.
116. See id. § 603A.920.
117. Id. 603A.215(3).
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the data collector, leaving extant the threat of liability regardless of
the degree of compliance undertaken.
This legislation makes no apparent distinctions in protective efforts
based on the size or transaction volume of the data collector. Given
the economics of PCI DSS compliance, this approach imposes poten-
tially significant burdens upon small merchants seeking protection
from litigation risks. Such merchants may only take comfort in know-
ing that the economics of litigation may also favor them, to the extent
that the prospects for damage recovery may be limited and thus make
litigation unattractive to a potential plaintiff.
Washington. The Washington legislature enacted a new law on
March 22, 2010, that became effective on July 1, 2010.118 This bill
states the legislature's intent "to encourage financial institutions to re-
issue credit and debit cards to consumers when appropriate, and to
permit financial institutions to recoup data breach costs associated
with the reissuance [of compromised cards] from large businesses and
card processors who are negligent in maintaining or transmitting card
data."119 In contrast to the Nevada legislation, the Washington law
expressly limits its impact to large businesses, defined to include an
entity (including government) that "processes more than six million
credit card and debit card transactions annually, and who provides,
offers or sells goods or services to persons who are residents of Wash-
ington." 120 Those who process card transactions are also included, as
well as vendors who sell software for these purposes.121
The bill provides a private cause of action for damages in favor of
financial institutions affected by a breach. In particular, the bill
provides:
If a processor or business fails to take reasonable care to guard
against unauthorized access to account information that is in the
possession or under the control of the business or processor, and the
failure is found to be the proximate cause of a breach, the processor
or business is liable to a financial institution for reimbursement of
reasonable actual costs related to the reissuance of credit cards and
debit cards that are incurred by the financial institution to mitigate
potential current or future damages to its credit card and debit card
holders that reside in the state of Washington as a consequence of
the breach, even if the financial institution has not suffered a physi-
cal injury in connection with the breach.122
118. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1055, § 3. The law applies prospectively to breaches on or after
the effective date. Id. § 4.
119. Id. § 1.
120. Id. § 2(1)(c).
121. See id. §§ 2(1)(h) (defining "processor"), (j) (defining "vendor").
122. Id. § 2(3)(a).
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The bill also provides for the recovery of attorney's fees, thus revers-
ing the typical "American Rule" applicable to attorney's fees and
turning this kind of litigation into a "loser pays" scenario, thus further
raising the stakes for the parties. 123
Vendors also face liability based on damages proximately caused by
the vendor's negligence, but only if "the claim is not limited or fore-
closed by another provision of law or by a contract to which the finan-
cial institution is a party."124 Thus, a software provider that fails to
prevent an unanticipated security breach may also face liability, de-
spite the fact that its contract with a merchant customer contains a
warranty provision that limits its damages. In this sense, this vendor
liability provision may truly raise the stakes for software developers,
creating a new risk that has thus far been remote. When more than
one party shares responsibility for the breach, the trier of fact must
allocate damages among them.125
Fortunately for affected entities, the statute has a safe harbor provi-
sion to protect against liability. The safe harbor provides in part:
Processors, businesses, and vendors are not liable under this section
if (a) the account information was encrypted at the time of the
breach, or (b) the processor, business, or vendor was certified com-
pliant with the payment card industry data security standards
adopted by the payment card industry security standards council,
and in force at the time of the breach.
Similar to the Nevada legislation, the statute allows for either compli-
ance or encryption. However, for this purpose, "encryption" is de-
fined to mean "enciphered or encoded using standards reasonable for
the breached business or processor taking into account the business or
processor's size and the number of transactions processed annu-
ally." 126 Thus, Washington attempts to provide a context for defining
encryption, which Nevada fails to do.
As for compliance, this bill treats validation by an annual security
assessment within the past year as conclusive protection against liabil-
ity. The bill provides in part:
A processor, business, or vendor will be considered compliant, if its
payment card industry data security compliance was validated by an
annual security assessment, and if this assessment took place no
more than one year prior to the time of the breach. For the pur-
123. See id.
124. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1053, § 2(3)(b).
125. See id. §§ 2(5) (allowing defenses of contract or of contributory or comparative negli-
gence), (6) (charging trier of fact with duty to determine percentage of fault attributable to every
entity).
126. Id. § 2(1)(f).
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poses of this subsection (2), a processor, business, or vendor's secur-
ity assessment of compliance is nonrevocable. The nonrevocability
of a processor, business, or vendor's security assessment of compli-
ance is only for the purpose of determining a processor, business, or
vendor's liability under this subsection (2).127
Washington's approach solves the problem of defining compliance,
which the Nevada law failed to do. As long as compliance certifica-
tion has been achieved (a process which also involves private order-
ing, as there is no government-based accreditation standard for
assessing compliance), the entity may not be held liable under this
section. This liability shield apparently applies even if the entity may
be shown to be grossly negligent in handling data or in implementing
PCI DSS at the time the breach occurred.
The Washington legislation may channel behavior toward PCI DSS
compliance through an annual assessment process (thereby providing
an ancillary benefit to service providers in the form of a built-in de-
mand apart from private ordering within the card industry for third-
party compliance certification). 128 However, whether the bill achieves
its goal of providing marginal benefits to consumers by incentivizing
payment card issuers to reissue compromised cards seems dubious.
Whether card issuers need additional incentives has not been proven,
given that they must deal with claims for unauthorized charges from
cardholders with compromised security. The avoidance of those costs,
alone, would likely generate sufficient incentives for reissuance in
many cases.129
A liability safe harbor based on certification within the past year
does not seem to add much to the security of the payment card system
beyond that already required by private ordering. In fact, larger firms
must receive validation of compliance more often than annually under
current private ordering rules.130 Although it may induce some
smaller firms to move from a regime of self-validation to independent
validation, this may have the unintended consequence of significantly
raising costs for these smaller firms, which may be unable to afford the
substantial fixed costs associated with annual certification. Thus, an
unintended consequence of intervention may be to enhance the ad-
127. Id. § 2(2).
128. This form of embedding PCI DSS was also adopted by the State of Texas. On May 11,
2007, the Texas House of Representatives unanimously passed HB 3222, which mandates that
businesses that accept payment cards comply with all PCI DSS requirements effective January 1,
2009). See H.B. 3222, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
129. In fact, the potential recovery of costs and attorney's fees may induce a moral hazard in
the event that circumstances might indicate that disclosure of account information presents a low
risk of compromise for consumers. In this sense, the recovery may be inefficient.
130. See Part III, supra.
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vantages of larger firms over smaller ones. These considerations ap-
parently influenced Governor Schwarzenegger of California, who
vetoed a similar bill favoring issuing banks on the basis that it would
unfairly harm small businesses and that "the marketplace has already
assigned responsibilities and liabilities that provide for the protection
of consumers." 131
These three state laws provide divergent approaches to legislation,
which may provide some insights regarding their impact on the private
ordering regime. To varying degrees, they seek to induce behaviors
that will enhance security as a byproduct of granting a post hoc benefit
to issuing banks. Instead of creating a direct benefit to consumers, the
putative benefits are designed to flow through to them indirectly: first,
by incentivizing merchants to invest in security by forcing them to in-
ternalize additional costs that arise from a security breach; second, by
incentivizing issuing banks to engage in risk-avoidance behaviors that
are likely to protect consumers; and third, by preventing consumers
with account relationships from the consequences of additional costs
incurred by issuing banks.
The first and last reasons noted above are closely related. By real-
locating costs from the unsecure merchant to the issuing bank, con-
sumers with relationships to the issuing bank will likely experience a
reduction in their total costs. Conversely, those consumers may end
up paying more for goods at these merchants, which must ultimately
take into account security costs. But apart from the cost reallocation,
it remains unclear whether consumer welfare will be enhanced, partic-
ularly if there are significant transaction costs associated with litiga-
tion. As for the second reason, as previously stated, issuing banks
hardly need additional incentives to protect the security interests of
their cardholders. Although issuing banks are unlikely to experience
the direct costs of fraudulent charges (which are charged back to the
merchant in many cases),132 the indirect costs associated with cus-
tomer relations, (e.g., addressing fraud claims, resolving disputes, and
the like) are real costs that issuing banks must address, and therefore
are incentivized to avoid. Moreover, issuing banks have also exper-
ienced some nudging toward security monitoring behavior from the
federal government, which has imposed a so-called "red flags rule"
through the FTC and through bank regulatory agencies to require fi-
131. Mark MacCathy, Information Security Policy in the U.S. Retail Payments Industry, 2011
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3,17 (2011).
132. In some cases, issuing banks may indeed bear some of these fraud losses. For example,
issuing banks bear fraud losses associated with debit cards where PIN requirements are satisfied.
See MacCathy, supra note 131, at 1 33.
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nancial institutions and other creditors to implement monitoring pro-
tocols designed to inform customers when fraud may be present.133
These state laws reflect another problem, which is endemic to state-
based legislation: the scope of protection is necessarily limited due to
geographical boundaries. For example, in the Washington legislation,
a business need not be physically present in Washington for this law to
apply; the law includes one "who provides, offers, or sells goods or
services to persons who are residents of Washington." 134 This rule po-
tentially reaches beyond the state's borders, but as a practical matter a
successful plaintiff must overcome jurisdictional barriers in seeking to
litigate the rights granted by these statutes.
C. Federal Intervention: The FTC, the Fed,
the CFPB, and Beyond?
The discussion above has illustrated several specific examples of
state-law intervention upon the private ordering regime. The federal
government has intervened extensively in the credit aspects of the
payment card industry, which has included massive legislative and reg-
ulatory reform.135 Behavioral economics has played a large part in
this regulation, where private ordering has clearly been disrupted
through prescriptions that are designed to protect consumers from
practices the government deems unfair.136
However, in matters of security, federal intervention has been lim-
ited in the area of legislation, but greater in the matter of discretion-
ary intervention from regulatory agencies. As discussed below, the
legislative incursion has proved disastrous, while discretionary inter-
vention has injected additional uncertainty into the marketplace.
Neither of these approaches has clearly delivered improvements on
the private ordering regime.
1. Legislating Security: FACTA
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) 13 7
includes provisions that target a very narrow problem-credit card
133. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 'RED FLAG' REGULATIONS REQUIRE FINANCIAL IN-
STIfUTIONS AND CREDITORS TO HAVE IDENTITY THEFr PREVENTION PROGRAMS (June 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/07/redflagsfyi.shtm.
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.020(1)(c) (2011).
135. See, e.g., Rick Fischer, Daniel Laudicina, & Obrea Poindexter, The New Credit Card
Rules, 65 Bus. LAw. 537 (2010) (chronicling recent regulations and legislation governing credit
card lending).
136. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN
L. REV. 749 (2008).
137. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat 1952 (Dec. 4. 2003).
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numbers and expiration dates displayed on printed receipts.138 Since
receipts could easily fall into the wrong hands, FACTA requires
merchants to truncate credit and debit card numbers, limiting that dis-
play to no more than the last five digits, and to block out expiration
dates on printed receipts. 139
However, this statutory regime applies only to "receipts that are
electronically printed." 140 Transactions that generate receipts by
handwriting or by taking an imprint or making a copy of the card are
expressly exempted. 141 FACTA's restriction clearly fits the retail
merchant in a brick-and-mortar operation that electronically scans a
payment card and gives an electronic receipt to a customer. It does
not fit smaller merchants using carbon-based forms to take imprints of
the customer's card. Although technology and the desire to limit
processing costs (both the product of private ordering within the pay-
ment network) would gradually eliminate those carbon paper forms, it
appears that Congress was sufficiently concerned about the potential
costs associated with changing to new systems that required all
merchants to adopt new technology, despite the risks presented by
paper forms displaying full card information.
Viewed from an economic perspective, this restrictive approach to-
ward reducing security risks may be justified when the expected con-
sumer harm (and merchant losses) from reduced access to payment
options may outweigh the limited marginal risk from the low-volume
and high-cost form of identity theft based on carbon forms. 142 How-
ever, in terms of addressing the real costs of crime, paper receipts
would likely present a higher-cost alternative for a prospective fraud-
ster than unencrypted electronic data, which is not covered by
FACTA. In this sense, FACTA is highly underinclusive, particularly
considering recent Seventh Circuit interpretation of the Act as not
applying to electronic receipts.143
138. See id. § 113 (Supp. 2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2006).
140. Id. § 1681c(g)(2).
141. Id.
142. "Within the payment card industry, variable security assessment obligations apply de-
pending on the size of the merchant, thus reflecting a similar approach toward balancing security
and the value of consumer access." Edward Morse, The FACTA the Matter: Recent Cases In-
volving Payment Card Receipts Illustrate Flaws in "Bounty" Enforcement Regime, 6 LYDIAN J. 1,
17 n.11 (Apr. 2011), available at http://pymnts.comfThe-FACTA-the-Matter-Recent-Cases-
Involving-Payment-Card-Receipts-Illustrate-Flaws-in-Bounty-Enforcement-Regime/.
143. The Seventh Circuit has recently interpreted the scope of an "electronically printed"
receipt to require printing on paper by the merchant at the point of sale. See Shlahtichman v. 1-
800 Contacts, Inc., 615 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1007 (2011). Receipts
sent by email from an online vendor, or receipts displayed electronically in an online transaction,
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FACTA is also overinclusive to the extent that the statute poten-
tially subjects merchants to sanctions for behavior that poses no
meaningful risk to consumers. Consider, for example, Bateman v.
American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,144 in which the AMC movie theater
chain allegedly printed the first four and the last four card numbers of
their customers on some 290,000 printed receipts. The middle eight
card digits were still blocked, however, leaving a potential fraudster
with the prospect of choosing from among 100 million different com-
binations in order to find the functional card number. A FACTA vio-
lation could also occur if the merchant disclosed only the expiration
date on a payment card, without disclosing any other card numbers. 145
This likewise presents no appreciable risk to consumers in the absence
of other information.
Other federal laws or regulations dealing with consumer financial
privacy, such as Gramm-Leach-Bliley, generally rely on regulatory
agencies for enforcement. 146 This ensures that agency discretion can
be brought to bear in determining the appropriate result for a putative
violation. However, FACTA permits enforcement through litigation
by consumers affected by unlawful disclosure. Whereas actual dam-
ages are likely to be limited or even nonexistent-a phenomenon that
is recognized in other litigation based on data security breachesl47 -
FACTA provides an option to pursue statutory damages ranging from
$100 to $1,000 for every willful violation, along with the recovery of
attorney's fees. 1 4 8 Combining this provision with class action litigation
can thereby transform a disclosure causing little or no actual con-
sumer harm into a significant liability event for a noncompliant
merchant. For example, in Bateman,149 the Ninth Circuit allowed
are thus not subject to the FACTA restrictions. This was an issue of first impression at the
appellate level, but the result is consistent with that of a majority of federal district courts that
have considered this issue. See id. at 798 (citing cases, including those which have taken the
minority view that FACTA covers electronic receipts.).
144. 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
145. See § 1681c(g)(1) (restricting the display of "more than the last 5 digits of the card num-
ber or the expiration date") (emphasis added). See, e.g., Shlahtichman, 615 F.3d at 796 (alleging
FACTA violation based solely on disclosure of expiration date).
146. See, e.g., § 6805 (delegating enforcement authority to federal functional regulations, state
insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission).
147. For a recent case taking up the issue of whether an increased risk of identity theft could
be considered as a basis for Article III standing, see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139
(9th Cir. 2010).
148. See 15 U.S.C. §1681n. FACTA shares this statutory damage provision with the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, which has likewise been interpreted by the Seventh Circuit as eligible for
class certification despite the potential for damages that are significantly greater than actual
harm. See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 951 (7th Cir. 2006).
149. 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
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class certification for a FACTA violation despite the fact that AMC's
potential liability was "enormous and out of proportion to any harm
suffered by the class." 50
Congress has recognized that the FACTA enforcement regime had
generated significant class action lawsuits against merchants. In 2008,
it amended FACTA to address litigation against merchants who had
erroneously disclosed only the card expiration date.151 Merchants had
apparently misread the disjunctive construction of the statute and
printed receipts with truncated card numbers along with expiration
dates, triggering hundreds of lawsuits to collect statutory damages for
a willful violation. As Congress had explained in connection with this
amendment, "[T]he purpose of this Act is to ensure that consumers
suffering from any actual harm to their credit or identity are protected
while simultaneously limiting the abusive lawsuits that do not protect
consumers but only result in increased cost to business and potentially
increased prices to consumers." 5 2
However, the safe harbor protection enacted was narrowly crafted
to exempt expiration date disclosures between December 4, 2004 and
June 3, 2008 from the category of willful violations eligible for statu-
tory damages.153 Although aware of class action litigation involving
FACTA (and thus able to surmise the potential for large statutory
damage awards), Congress did not restrict the class action remedy or
impose a cap on recoveries, which it had done in other contexts in-
volving statutory damages.154
Bateman illustrates that FACTA may provide windfalls for "bounty
hunters" motivated by the profit potential from statutory damage
awards coupled with attorney fees, but those awards come at a signifi-
cant cost to consumers. Although the liability threat from statutory
damages may indeed induce greater merchant vigilance, the dispro-
portionate nature of that liability in relation to consumer harm will
likely trigger overinvestment by merchants in monitoring and compli-
ance (in relation to the real risks of causing actual damages), buying
essentially no marginal protection for consumers in return.
In cases involving minor infractions of FACTA, litigation costs ef-
fectively purchase no benefits from enhanced security. In enacting the
150. Id. at 710.
151. See Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122
Stat 1565 (2008).
152. Id. § 2(b).
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d) (Supp. 2010) (codifying the safe harbor).
154. See Bateman, 623 F.3d at 720-21 (noting damage caps added to the Truth in Lending
Act).
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Clarification Act in 2008, Congress made a rare admission that
FACTA effectively harmed consumers through raising litigation costs.
Nevertheless, Congress chose to leave the statutory liability regime in
place, even when violations did not present risks of consumer harm.
This is hardly an improvement over private ordering, and in fact
shows quite the opposite effect. Payment card data security standards
emerging after 2003, as discussed below, would ultimately provide
greater protection, and without the significant external costs associ-
ated with the private bounty system, which persist to this day.
2. Discretionary Protection by the Federal Trade Commission
The FTC, operating under its authority to address unfair trade prac-
tices, 55 has also provided an important federal presence in driving
data security practices. We have elsewhere chronicled the efforts of
the FTC to bring actions against large firms that have failed to main-
tain the security of their customers' data, including actions against
Choicepoint, TJMaxx, and Heartland Payment Systems. 156 This gen-
eral authority may serve a useful purpose in providing an additional
threat against behavior that the agency may characterize as "unfair"
and thus within the scope of its powers, including the power to impose
monetary penalties and to require remedial behavior. Moreover, the
discretionary approach for enforcement by an agency that has limited
resources may present a greater likelihood that those resources will
not be addressed on merely technical violations that present no mean-
ingful threat to consumer well-being.
The discretionary nature of current FTC powers presents its own
basis for concern. As long as the parameters of what is "unfair" are
undefined by regulation, a potential exists for this power to be abused.
Uncertainty may present some impetus for additional security innova-
tion within the private sector, which is designed to keep ahead of the
need for government interference.
Threats of greater regulatory authority to be exercised by the FTC
have been presented in recent legislation. Late in 2009, the House
passed H.R. 2221, the Data Accountability and Trust Act, which ad-
dressed several aspects of the data security breach problem.'57 It in-
cluded a federal notification rule for data security breaches, thus
preempting the state laws on this subject.158 It also delegated author-
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 47 (2006).
156. See Morse & Raval, supra note 27; Morse & Raval, supra note 88.
157. H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). A committee report from the Committee on
Energy and Commerce is also available. See H.R. REP. No. 111-362 (2009).
158. H.R. 2221 § 3.
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ity to the FTC to promulgate regulations "to require each person en-
gaged in interstate commerce that owns or possesses data containing
personal information, or contracts to have any third party entity main-
tain such data for such person, to establish and implement policies and
procedures regarding information security practices .... ."159 These
regulations would preempt state information security laws, thereby
ensuring a single federal source for compliance.160
Although businesses may prefer a single federal source for law,
thereby avoiding the complexity of a patchwork of state rules, the
prospects of expanding agency power leave open the problem of pre-
scribing content to new regulations. For example, with regard to pay-
ment systems, would the FTC choose to "in-source" the PCI DSS
infrastructure, including compliance mechanisms, and perhaps make
them more robust? Would the compliance requirements continue to
be prescribed in a manner that respects the differential ability be-
tween small and large firms to bear the significant costs of acquiring
and maintaining a PCI DSS infrastructure? There are many unan-
swered questions with this legislation's attempt to delegate regulatory
power. The problems of data security breaches surely go beyond the
payment card industry, and many nuanced questions concerning the
appropriate standards for different kinds of data remain, which the
payment card industry has not addressed.
It should be noted that the legislative approach in HR 2221 contin-
ued present law in failing to provide a private cause of action for data
security breaches. Thus, this bill would not repeat the inefficient
bounty system that was exposed in FACTA. 161 However, it would
grant enforcement powers to the FTC and state attorneys general, in-
cluding the imposition of civil penalties and fines, not to exceed a total
of $5 million. 162 Although this bill expired when the 111th Congress
adjourned in 2010, it is possible that others like it will emerge in the
112th Congress. 163 However, as discussed below, there may be new
sheriffs in town, which could displace the FTC's role in this area.
159. Id. § 2(a)(1).
160. See id. § 6.
161. See FACTA supra note 137, at 18.
162. See H.R. 2221 § 4.
163. See, e.g., Cyber Security and American Cyber Competitiveness Act of 2011, S. 21, 112th
Cong. (2011) (This "sense of Congress" supports legislation "to secure the United States against
cyber attack, to enhance American competitiveness and create jobs in the information technol-
ogy industry, and to protect the identities and sensitive information of American citizens and
businesses .... ); see also Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong.
(introduced Apr. 12, 2011) (section 406 provides no private right of action); Data Security Act of
2011, S. 1434, 112th Cong. (introduced July 28, 2011) (Section 5(c) provides no private right of
action). But see Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1535, 112th
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3. Other Competing Federal Regulators
It appears that the primacy of the FTC as the locus of federal au-
thority for data security matters affecting payment cards may be chal-
lenged by other federal agencies, including the Federal Reserve and
other functional federal regulators in charge of banks. The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act'" creates a
new agency, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, estab-
lished within the Federal Reserve System, which "shall regulate the
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services
under the Federal consumer financial laws." 165 The purpose of the
Bureau is stated as follows: "The Bureau shall seek to implement and,
where applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently
for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets
for consumer financial products and services and that markets for con-
sumers financial products and services are fair, transparent, and com-
petitive."166 Although at first glance one might conclude that the
Bureau's focus may not be directed to data security practices, it
should be noted that the objectives of the bureau include ensuring
that "consumers are protected from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts
and practices. . . . ."167 Of course, as the FTC has demonstrated, poor
data security practices may indeed be "unfair practices" for purposes
of implementing its consumer protection powers.168
Provisions in Dodd-Frank appear to contemplate that the FTC and
the Bureau will negotiate their enforcement roles in areas where their
authority may overlap.16 9 Moreover, the Bureau has received express
grants of enforcement authority over any rule prescribed by the FTC
"with respect to an unfair or deceptive act or practice" when it affects
consumer protection matters covered by the Bureau.170 Although the
Bureau has not yet exercised its enforcement or rulemaking pow-
Cong. (reported from the Committee on Judiciary Sept 22, 2011), § 205, (allowing "supplemental
enforcement" by individuals and permitting civil damages of not more than ten thousand dollars
per day for each person affected, not more than twenty million dollars per violation, as well as
punitive damages).
164. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
165. See id. § 1011, 124 Stat. 1964. Title X may be cited as the "Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Act of 2010." See id. § 1001, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491).
166. Id. § 1021(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).
167. Id. § 1021(b)(2).
168. See supra note 156.
169. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1989.
170. See id. § 1061(b)(5), 124 Stat. 2037.
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ers,171 it remains to be seen whether the Bureau will take on the issue
of data security standards for payment cards.
Elsewhere in the Federal Reserve, the issue of payment card data
security standards is currently on the front burner in the form of a
regulation project. The so-called "Durbin Amendment," Section 1075
of Dodd-Frank, grants regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve to
address "reasonable fees and rules for payment card transactions." 1 7 2
This general grant of authority may ultimately involve regulations
dealing with data security requirements, to the extent that fraud pre-
vention measures may have an impact on the cost structures associ-
ated with payment card fees charged within the network. Proposed
regulations issued on December 28, 2010,173 included a request for
comments on proposals to address fraud prevention measures:
The Board's proposal requests comment on two general approaches
to the fraud-prevention adjustment framework and asks several
questions related to the two alternatives. One approach focuses on
implementation of major innovations that would likely result in sub-
stantial reductions in total, industry-wide fraud losses. The second
approach focuses on reasonably necessary steps for an issuer to
maintain an effective fraud-prevention program, but would not pre-
scribe specific technologies that must be employed as part of the
program. At this time, the Board is not proposing a specific adjust-
ment to the amount of an interchange fee for an issuer's fraud-pre-
vention costs. After considering the comments received, the Board
expects to develop a specific proposal on the fraud adjustment for
public comment. 174
The regulatory path that will ultimately be chosen here is unclear.
However, the private ordering regime is under scrutiny, and more
than one federal agency may ultimately become involved in deciding
how the payment card industry should deal with the matter of secur-
ity. The target of these regulations will nominally be large issuing
banks, as the Durbin Amendment purports to exempt small issuers,
defined as those with assets of less than $10 billion, from the impact of
required rulemaking. 175 However, the practical import of that limita-
171. The CFPB's website discusses its current activities, which appear to be mostly educa-
tional. See CONSUMER FIN. PROTECrION BUREAU, www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Jan.
11, 2012). The website explains that "[miany of the prices of the Dodd-Frank Act relating to the
CFPB will go into effect on July 21, 2011." Id.
172. Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1075, 124 Stat. 2068 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2).
173. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
[Regulation II, Docket No. R-1404, RIN 7100-AD63], "Debit Card Interchange Fees and Rout-
ing," 75 Fed. Reg. 81,722 (Dec. 28, 2010).
174. Id. at 81,722.
175. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. 2070 (adding § 920(a)(6) to the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16930-2).
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tion throughout the network also remains to be seen. Payment net-
works function efficiently and effectively across a broad range of
participants, and as a practical matter, regulatory choices that emerge
in this context will likely affect all participants, perhaps through inter-
vention by the card networks. 76 The bottom line question is this: Is
the mosaic of regulation at state and federal levels hindering rather
than helping institute a sound market model? Should the policy mak-
ers be seeking ways to empower the private ordering solution?
V. SUMMARY OF POLICY AND RESEARCH ISSUES;
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In a rather comprehensive analysis and discussion of the private or-
dering realm of the payment card industry, we have identified three
distinct facets of the problem space: (1) Ubiquity of the infrastructure,
its global reach and technology dependence; (2) the infrastructure of
PCI DSS and its strengths and limitations; and (3) the incursions of
regulations and laws, including disclosure requirements, in the pay-
ment card industry. The table below poses the questions that emerge
from our analysis.
The public legal system has modified the payment card industry's
private ordering regime in several respects, while generally leaving
significant portions of the regime intact and functioning outside the
reach of law. Historically speaking, apart from limited federal inter-
vention by the FTC, legislative solutions to perceived problems in the
private ordering regime have come primarily from the states, reflect-
ing a fragmented approach toward regulatory change. This perhaps
suggests the federal system operating in the United States is working
as a "laboratory" in which various states experiment with legislation,
as Justice Brandeis suggested in his famous dissenting opinion more
than 75 years ago.177
176. For perspective on this issue from credit unions, many of which may be under the ten
billion dollar limit, see ADAM J. LEVITIN, INTERCHANGE REGULATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CREDIT UNIONS (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/levitinfilene
-paper.pdf. Professor Levitin also suggests industry conformity as a possible response to regula-
tions that nominally affect only larger issuers. See id. at 36.
177. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."). It should be noted, however, that the "experiment" at issue in
Liebmann involved a state law that allowed a private firm to exclude a competitor from entering
the ice business. The majority did not disagree with the principle of experimentation, but would
not countenance state interference that was deemed arbitrary and unreasonable. See id. at
279-80 ("It is plain that unreasonable or arbitrary interference or restrictions cannot be saved
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Policy issues:
* Market price effects of breaches are significant and long term.
o Policy issues/decisions, therefore, are nontrivial.
* Is the mosaic of regulation at state and federal level hindering rather
than helping develop a sound market model?
o Are the states (and the fed) using a bolt-on, built-in, or embedded
approach? Do regulations converge and empower the private
ordering solution?
* Is the due process for determining requirements fair, transparent,
complete?
o Is there a due process for determining how the assessment will be
conducted? (PCI DSS auditing standards).
o Are there set assurance requirements (audit opinions)?
o Why is the enforcement issue left under the control of the card
brand owners? Are expectations of card brands consistent with each
other?
* Infrastructure and participants are globally domiciled.
O No U.S. agency has global reach.
* Certification process is embedded within the infrastructure.
o Qualifications, certification, training of ASQs is within the domain-
a conflict of interest issue.
O Internal security assessors are trained by the PCI SSC-an
independence issue.
o Only QSAs have the accommodation to have PCI Forensic
Investigators (PFI).
* Pace of change in technology and its use is significant.
o Is the council moving fast enough? Is the direction of development
consistent with technology change? Are SIGs currently identified
enough?
o Can appropriate revisions in the law be expected to occur in a
timely manner consistent with the dynamically changing technology,
which affects the core requirements intended as solutions?
As Justice Brandeis also noted in that same dissenting opinion,
whether legislation is effective to achieve the purposes for which it is
enacted, or whether it reflects sound economic principles, are matters
that are supposed to be left to the discretion of the legislature:
Whether the enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on
sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired result, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner, are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the earnest conflict
from the condemnation of [the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] merely by
calling them experimental.").
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of serious opinion does not suffice to bring them within the range of
judicial cognizance.178
Unfortunately, legislative incursions on private ordering are often mo-
tivated by politics, which does not always reflect sound economic anal-
ysis. For example, cost-benefit studies of various regulatory efforts
aimed at achieving measures of public safety have vast differences in
their cost-effectiveness, ranging from seatbelt and airbag require-
ments in automobiles (less than $150,000 per life saved) to hazardous
waste listings from certain wood-preserving chemicals (nearly $10 bil-
lion per life saved). 179 In the matter of air transportation, a require-
ment of hardened cockpit doors costs only $800,000 per life saved,
while the Federal Air Marshal program may cost as much as $180 mil-
lion per life saved.180 Psychological and political aspects of risk per-
ception are the likely explanations for these varying resource
allocations, which are not based on any coherent standard about ac-
ceptable levels of risk.' 8'
Anecdotal evidence concerning data security legislation described
above suggests that legislative reactions have occurred in response to
notorious cases involving security breaches, which therefore precipi-
tate political interest in formulating a response.182 As previously dis-
cussed, some of these responses have been useful in formulating new
approaches to adjust market incentives, including state disclosure
laws. A single federal standard for disclosure of security breaches
may well achieve a better result than a patchwork of state laws gov-
erning these responsibilities, but this may not sit well with the state
political actors who seek to protect their authority to protect citizens
within their jurisdictions.' 83 Fine tuning breach disclosure require-
178. See id. at 285 (quoting Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549,
569 (1911)).
179. See Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, A Risk and Cost-Benefit Assessment of United
States Aviation Security Measures, 1 J. TRANS. SEC. 143, 145-46 (2008) (indicating that these
figures reflect a conversion of 1995 cost estimates to 2008 dollars, using a conversion ratio of
1.38).
180. See id. at 143.
181. See id. at 145-46. Stewart & Mueller suggest that an emerging benchmark for saving a
life ranges from $1 to $10 million. See id. at 143. Of course, allegations of protective efforts
producing costly outcomes are not limited to regulation aimed at lifesaving. See, e.g., David S.
Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009
on Consumer Credit, 22 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 277 (2010) (critiquing the likely outcome of
enhanced financial regulation as making credit more expensive and difficult to obtain, substitut-
ing the choices of bureaucrats over consumers, and jeopardizing the financial recovery).
182. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 83, at 1105-12 (highlighting various breaches giving rise to
federal bills involving data security); Winn, supra note 73, at 1142-44 (discussing history of Cali-
fornia's security breach notification law).
183. See Regan, supra note 83 at 1120-21 (summarizing political views of those who champion
states' rights and preservation of localized authority over consumer protection issues).
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ments to displace individual notification requirements would likely
enhance consumer welfare on account of significant cost savings, but
this is fraught with political difficulty due to the appearance of letting
a breaching firm off more easily than under current law.
Statutes designed to reallocate costs from breaching merchants to
issuing banks seem to present the risk that legislatures will reallocate
costs within the system based on their political preferences. 184 By cre-
ating a new path toward cost reallocation associated with payment
card reissuance, there may be some marginal impact on security be-
havior by merchants on account of the liability threat. However, not
all merchants will be able to bear those costs as effectively as the issu-
ing banks, which have significant fee bases from a broad range of cus-
tomers. Moreover, as discussed above, large transaction costs are
likely in litigation, making consumer welfare enhancement unlikely.
To the extent that payment networks require cost reallocations as a
matter of private ordering, they are likely to take into account the
business realities in this environment, particularly when other pay-
ment forms are constantly evolving to challenge the existing regime.
Although security is often a public good that is paid for by public
funds, which cover police and other law enforcement protections, pri-
vate firms also incur significant costs to guard against threats posed by
criminal elements. Security costs to implement PCI DSS are signifi-
cant, entailing fixed costs for a security infrastructure as well as ongo-
ing expenditures to maintain and monitor compliance.185 Large firms
with broad transaction bases are likely to have an advantage over
their small business counterparts in terms of their ability to support
these expenditures for security. However, small businesses are very
vulnerable to security threats, and they frequently lack the resources
to address them.186 Technology may provide new solutions in a cost-
effective manner, but until those solutions emerge, a differential risk
environment is likely to exist.
184. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve may achieve the same result through its regulatory
powers. See the proposed regulations at Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg.
43,478, 43,478-01 (July 20, 2011) (adopting interim final rules and requesting comments on ad-
justments to debit card interchange transaction fees for fraud-prevention costs). But cf, Todd J.
Zywicki, The Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees and the Limits of Regulation, ICLE
FINANCIAL REGULATORY PROGRAM WHITE PAPER SERIES (Jun. 2010), available at http://ssrn.
comlabstract=1624002 (criticism of this reallocation process, and the political dimensions of
those choices)
185. See Part III(C).
186. See Larry Barrett, What SMBs Don't Know about Security Can Hurt You, SMALL Bus.
COMPUTING (Apr. 23, 2010), available at www.smallbusinesscomputing.comnews/article.php/387
8266/ (noting a Panda Security report which concludes that "SMBs typically have fewer in-house
resources and budgets for IT security, placing them at greater risk of attack.").
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This disparity between small and large businesses creates a particu-
larly difficult problem for legislators and regulators to resolve in seek-
ing to intervene in the private ordering regime. Currently, the
industry appears to be effectively exempting smaller businesses from
more rigorous compliance burdens applicable to larger firms at the
merchant level. This choice makes sense if one adopts the policy goal
of trying to secure the greatest number of transactions in the most
cost-effective way, while at the same time preserving the social bene-
fits of maximizing accessibility and use of payment cards in a broad
range of businesses. However, it will prove unsatisfying to those who
see security as an important consumer right, akin to privacy. Those
who prefer a larger federal role in shaping data security practices must
recognize that enforcing additional security protections will likely
have economic and social consequences, which deserve careful consid-
eration. Before displacing the private ordering regime, legislators and
regulators should have clear answers concerning the likely impacts
from their efforts to ensure that implementing their good intentions
does not raise consumer costs and restrict consumer access to their
preferred payment mechanisms.
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